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I. INTRODUCTION
A video game is an artistic creation that a craftsman expresses
through the medium of computer software as a colorful, graphic,
and thematic display of moving images. Participation in the video
game experience recently has become an immensely popular source
of entertainment, and since Atari, Inc. (Atari) introduced its first
generation of video games in 1977,1 the video game has reigned as
king of the American entertainment industry.' In 1981 consumers
spent an estimated 75,000 hours and five billion dollars playing
video games.3 These 1981 revenues totaled twice the reported in-
take of all Nevada casinos; almost twice the 2.8 billion dollar gross
earnings of the American movie industry; and three times the com-
bined total of television revenues and gate receipts of major league
baseball, basketball, and football." The potential for immense
profit in the video game production industry has motivated many
large and small companies to enter the video game market to com-
1. Nulty, Why the Craze Won't Quit, FORTUNE, Nov. 15, 1982, at 114, 116.
2. The video game industry's success also expanded internationally. Video Games have
achieved popularity in Amsterdam, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and West
Germany. Games That Play People, TmE, Jan. 18, 1982, at 50, 53. In the Philippines, how-
ever, public outcry against video games because of their perceived detrimental effects on the
morality of Philippino youth precipated President Ferdinand Marcos' November, 1982, ban
on video games in the Islands. Id.
3. Games That Play People, supra note 2, at 51. In 1982 home video games sales
totaled $2.1 billion and captured 31% of total toy industry sales, up from 19% in 1981. In
addition, video game arcade revenues amounted to approximately $6 billion in 1982. Recent
Development, Substantial Similarity Between Video Games: An Old Copyright Problem in
a New Medium, 36 V~im. L. Rav. 1277, 1277 n.1 (1983) (citing Leaf, Video Makes-and
Breaks-Toy Industry, 56 ELECTONIcs 84, 84-85 (Feb. 24, 1983)). Although sales of home
video game equipment have quadrupled since 1980, some analysts and game executives fore-
cast a drop in this growth rate during 1983. Nulty, supra note 1, at 115. Analysts, however,
disagree as to the speed and steepness of this decline. Id. Because only approximately one in
seven American homes and one in one hundred European and Japanese homes have video
games, industry optimists expect sales to expand at rates as high as 40% to 60% for the
next several years. Id.
Rapidly expanding technology is helping the industry attack the problem of declining
sales by enabling manufacturers to design new games that appeal to different social seg-
ments of society. Today, war-type video games, which appeal primarily to young men and
boys, dominate the market. Id. With this predominant theme, video games now are present
in approximately 12 million of the 83 million homes which own television sets. Perry Odak,
president of Atari's consumer products division, asserts that this statistic indicates "a tre-
mendous hole in the market." Atari plans to begin filling this market vacuum in early 1983
with the introduction of a line of children's games, some of which will have an educational
emphasis. Atari also plans to market a line of games that will appeal to women and other
games designed specifically for people over the age of forty-five. Id. See generally N.Y.
Times, Oct. 4, 1982, at 1, col. 3; Wall St. J., Jan. 19, 1983, at 1, col. 4.
4. Games That Play People, supra note 2, at 51.
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pete fiercely with Atari." This often cutthroats competition necessi-
tated massive advertising campaigns by gamemakers in 1982, and
has inspired a large number of patent violation and copyright in-
fringement claim filings in recent years.'
The video game designer is the lifeblood of today's video game
industry. Although novelty was the principle cause of the indus-
try's explosive growth during the late 1970s and early 1980s,9 the
intense competition and increasingly demanding buyers of today
are forcing video game companies to rely heavily on the game de-
signers' "rare blend of creativity and technological prowess" to
maintain their market shares.10 Video game companies are acutely
aware of the economic reality that most of the newly introduced
games fail."" Consequently, game manufacturers are beginning to
appreciate the video game designer as the "'heart and soul'" of
the entire industry. 2 These designers, of whom approximately a
dozen are acknowledged "superstars,"13 have ensured the survival
of the video game craze by elevating the game experience to in-
creasingly more colorful, challenging, and exciting levels.
14
5. Nulty, supra note 1, at 114. Some of the companies that presently compete strongly
with Atari are: Activision, Inc.; Coleco Industries, Inc.; Emerson Radio, Inc.; Mattel, Inc.;
Magnovox, Inc.; Bally Midway Manufacturing, Inc.; and the Milton-Bradley Company. Id.
6. Wall St. J., supra note 3, at 1.
7. Nulty, supra note 1, at 114-15. Gamemakers spent approximately 200 million dol-
lars on advertising in 1982. Atari and Mattel spent nearly one-half of this amount. Id.
8. See, e.g., Atari Inc. v. North. Am. Phillips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th
Cir. 1982); Stern Elec., Inc. v. Kaufman, 523 F. Supp. 635, 213 U.S.P.Q. 75 (E.D.N.Y. 1981),
[1981-1983] Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 1 25,363 (Dec. 4, 1981) affd 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.
1982). See Kramsky, The Video Game: Our Legal System Grapples with a Social Phenome-
non, 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 335 (1982); Jones, Video Game Litigation and the 1976 Copy-
right Act: The Ideas of Games, The Expression of Aliens and the Underlying Computer
Software, I J. COPYRIGHT, ENTERTAINMENT &. SPORTS L. 17 (1982).
9. Wall St. J., supra note 3, at 1.
10. Id. For example, Bally Midway Manufacturing Company, the creators of Pac-Man,
hired three 25-person teams consisting of engineers, artists, computer programmers, and
game developers to translate game ideas, drawings, and designs into intricate microchip cir-
cuitry. Games That Play People, supra note 2, at 54.
11. Wall St. J., supra note 3, at 1. See The Hottest Games in Town, 100 NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 16, 1982, at 55; Wiegner, New Stars, New Firmament, 129 FORBES, May 24, 1982, at 48;
Games That Play People, supra note 2, at 54; Shell, Games People Program, 83 TECH. REV.,
Nov.-Dec. 1980, at 10.
12. Wall St. J., supra note 3, at 1 (quoting James H. Levy, founder, president, and
chief executive of Activision, Inc., which makes home video cartridges for Atari.) Mr. Levy
believes that the good designers develop their own styles which consumers recognize. Thus,
their names become "'almost like brand names'" and help sell the games. Id.
13. Games That Play People, supra note 2, at 54.
14. See Nulty, supra note 1, at 114-15, for an excellent photographic history depicting
the developments in color, challenge, and graphical sophistication of video games. Advances
in computer software technology have made possible more creative programming and more
1226 [Vol. 36:1223
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Video game manufacturers are not the sole economic benefi-
ciaries of the games' tremendous popularity. Game distributors
and retail operators also have earned substantial profits from the
billions of quarters that players have dropped into video game ma-
chines in recent years.15 Typically, manufacturers sell these ma-
chines to distributors who lease them to owners of arcades, restau-
rants, taverns, and other business establishments for a percentage
of the lessee's gross revenues.16 Some businesses earn greater prof-
its from video game machines than from the other aspects of their
operations. 17 Much of the local business profit from video games
originates in the pockets of teenagers, who "tend to indulge-or
overindulge-against the wishes of their parents." 8 Thus, common
parental complaints that video games cause children to skip school
and steal quarters, and that arcades are "nothing but hangouts,"
' 9
have spurred widespread local governmental concern about the so-
cial problems accompanying large scale use of video games.20
colorful and detailed video graphics. Id. at 120. The first generation of video games that
Atari introduced in the mid-1970s are primitive in comparison to today's games. Id. The
industry's first success, Atari's Pong, was a simple black and white video rendition of ping-
pong. Id. at 115. Micro Surgeon, however, which Imagic, Inc. introduced in the fall of 1982,
presents "the player with a kaleidoscopic view of the human body as [it] battles disease."
Id.
15. M. Jaffe, Regulating Video Games, American Planning Ass'n, Planning Advisory
Service Report No. 370 at 1 (Sept. 1982) (available by request at the following address:
American Planning Association, 1776 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036).
16. Id. Depending on the business establishment's location, video game machines can
gross up to $1000 per week. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2.
19. Id.
20. Id. Local government regulation of video games is widespread and sometimes arbi-
trary. See infra notes 37-131 and accompanying text. This inconsistent regulation exists
despite the many socially beneficial uses of video games. The United States Army, educa-
tors, hospitals, and therapists, for example, are using video games productively. At Fort
Eustis, Va., the United States Army uses a modified version of Atari's "Battlezone" game as
a weapons training device. Games That Play People, supra note 2, at 54. See N.Y. Times,
July 10, 1982, at 9, col. 2; Video Games Train the Army, 90 Sci. DIG., Mar. 1982, at 24. The
Epilepsy Center at the Johns Hopkins Medical School in Baltimore, Maryland, employs
specially wired video games to monitor the effects of anticonvulsant drugs on the learning
and physical abilities of their patients. Games That Play People, supra note 2, at 54. Dr.
Eileen Vining, associate director of the Epilepsy Center, asserts that these games benefit
therapeutic training because "children are eager to make their best efforts in eye-hand coor-
dination tests." Id. Video Games serve other therapeutic and medically related purposes.
See Electronic Games Help The Handicapped, 90 Sci. DIG., July 1982, at 89. The Capital
Children's Museum in Washington, D.C., uses video games to provide computer instruction
to preschool children. Games That Play People, supra note 2, at 54. See Levin, They Zap,
Crackle and Pop, But Video Games Can Be Powerful Tools for Learning, 17 PxoPLz WKLY.,
May 31, 1982, at 74; Comfort, The Joy of Video Games, 90 Sci. DIG., April, 1982, at 44
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Land-use planning regulation is one attempted solution that
local governments have applied to the complaints and problems at-
tributable to commercial video games. Although parental com-
plaints about out-of-home video game use may be quite justifia-
ble,21 these and other moral issues generally are not legitimate
land-use planning concerns.22 Rather, city planners must distin-
guish between legitimate planning goals, which derive generally
from police powers that states delegate to municipalities," and the
(video games are valuable tools in teaching children physics).
21. Video games critics cite evidence suggesting that excessive playing may be addic-
tive, psychologically harmful, and conducive to gang activity, and may encourage other ag-
gressive and antisocial behavior. M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 2. See also N.Y. Times, Sept. 2,
1982, at 26, col. 2 (editorial concerning parents' displeasure with video games); N.Y. Times,
May 23, 1982, § 11, at 1, col. 1 (residents of Cliffside, New Jersey, organized movement to
ban video game parlors because of fear of teenage misconduct). But see N.Y. Times, Janu-
ary 20, 1982, at 26, col. 4 (suggesting that there is no scientific evidence that video games are
psychologically harmful). See generally Video Games - Fun or Serious Threat, 92 U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 22, 1982, at 7 (debating social problems and benefits associated
with commercial video game playing).
22. M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 2. For example, in State v. Bloss, 62 Hawaii 147, 613
P.2d 354 (1980), the Hawaii Supreme Court invalidated on equal protection grounds a mu-
nicipal ordinance that prohibited pinball game purveyors from allowing persons under the
age of eighteen to loiter near or play a pinball machine unless accompanied by a parent,
guardian, or authorized adult. The ordinance's legislative history stated that one of the main
reasons the municipality passed the ordinance was to prevent children from spending their
lunch money on pinball. Id. The court held that this motive was not a valid purpose for
classifying pinball games differently than other games of skill. In addition, the court rea-
soned that it could visualize many other legal ways in which children foolishly could spend
their lunch money. Id.
23. Because the United States Constitution grants all sovereign states inherent police
authority to control land use within their boundaries, state legislatures possess complete
authority to create municipal corporations and to control these municipalities subject to
constitutional limitation. Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U.S. 540 (1876); 0. REYNOLDS,
LocAL GOVERNMENT LAW 75 (1982); 56 Am. Jtm. 2D Municipal Corporations § 125 (1976).
But see Northwestern School Dist. v. Pittenger, 397 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (holding
that a municipal corporation has no rights under the Constitution which it may use against
the authority of its creator state). State legislatures usually delegate powers of self-govern-
ance to municipalities through statutory grant or constitutional provision. 56 AM. Jur. 2D,
supra at § 125. Today, most states also have adopted special constitutional provisions that
allow municipalities to adopt their own charters and submit them for legislative approval.
Id. at § 126. Once the legislatures approve these charters, the legislatures may not alter
them until the municipality adopts another one in the same manner. Id. Municipal charters,
together with other relevant state statutes and constitutional provisions that delegate power
to municipalities, constitute their home rule charter. 0. REYNOLDS, supra, at 136. When
state and local law conflict, state law governs statewide interests and local law prevails on
local issues. Difficulty often arises, however, in distinguishing between purely state and
purely local issues. 0. REYNOLDS, supra, at 136. See generally 1 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICWAL COR-
PORATION LAW §§ 3.10, 3.17 (1983); see, e.g., City of Thorton v. Farmers Reservoir & Irriga-
tion Co., 194 Colo. 526, 575 P.2d 382 (1978) (holding that municipality's operation of a
water works was purely a local matter that municipal home law controlled). If a municipal-
ity does not adopt a home rule, state statutes and constitutional provisions dictate its local
1228
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quagmire of important but nonplanning public concerns.24 Land-
use regulation of video games involves both traditional planning
goals such as "minimizing their adverse effects" on adjacent com-
munities, 5 and special concerns such as congested traffic, crime,
inadequate parking, late night hours of operation, litter, loitering,
and vandalism.2 6 The process of regulating video game entertain-
ment establishments often compels local governments to weigh the
positions of competing interest groups. Concerned citizens and dis-
gruntled parents demand harsh regulation of video game machines
to preserve neighborhood peace and the moral character of their
youth, but local businessmen, who legitimately offer profitable
video game entertainment to "millions of consumers who just hap-
pen to be teenagers,"2 seek reasonable regulation of their busi-
nesses.29 Municipalities have attacked these problems primarily by
enacting new licensing and zoning ordinances and by strictly en-
forcing extant ordinances that are broad enough to encompass
powers. 0. REYNOLDS, supra, at 137 (citing Morehead v. Dyer, 518 P.2d 1105 (Okla. 1973)).
Regardless of whether a municipality possesses home rule or derives its powers solely from
state statutes or constitutional provisions, the majority of states follow the Dillon Rule in
determining the complete scope of powers of a local government. Id. (citing J. DILLON, MU-
NICIPAL COPORATIONS § 55 (1st ed. 1872)). For a list of states that use the Dillon Rule, see 2
E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICn'IA. CoRuoRATIONS § 10.09 nn. 58, 59 (rev. 3d ed. 1976). The Dillon
Rule states that local governments have "(1) those powers expressly conferred by State
constitution, state statutes, and (where applicable) home-rule charter, (2) those powers nec-
essarily or fairly implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly granted, and (3) those
powers essential to the declared objects and purposes of the municipality or quasi-corpora-
tion." 0. REYNOLDS, supra, at 137 (emphasis in original).
24. M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 2.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 1-2. The video game industry acknowledges that an
estimated 50% to 75% of video game customers are under the age of 19. Zeigler, Regulating
Video Games: Mixed Results in the Courts, 34 LAND Usz L. & ZONINo DIG., Apr. 1982, at 4.
See N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1982, § 23, at 22, col. 3 (suggesting that the video game contro-
versy illustrates adult insecurity about whether contemporary youth have adopted tradi-
tional morals and values).
28. M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 1.
29. Amusement & Music Operators Ass'n., Guidelines for AMOA Members Regarding
Local Regulations of Amusement Games § 1 (1982) (hereinafter cited as Amusement
Ass'n.)(available by request at the following address: Amusement & Music Operators Associ-
ation, 2000 Spring Road, Oak Brook, Illinois 60521). The Amusement & Music Operators
Association (AMOA), a nonprofit trade association of manufacturers, distributors, and oper-
ators representing the coin-operated amusement game and jukebox industries, contends
that if operators and location owners of amusement games can regulate themselves, local
regulation generally is neither necessary nor desirable. Id. If local regulation becomes neces-
sary, however, they argue that "an ordinance which is positive and narrowly drawn-and
not punative or confiscatory in nature-best serves the interests of the municipality, the
consumer and the operator." Id.
1983] 1229
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video games.30 Also, municipalities less frequently attempt to regu-
late video games and curb the social problems attendant to large
scale video game use through taxation l and antigambling laws. 2
Some of the regulations arguably are severe and unreasonable,
and commercial video game purveyors have challenged their con-
stitutionality, primarily with fourteenth amendment due process
and equal protection claims, 3 with varying degrees of success.
34
Video game proponents, however, recently have introduced a more
powerful constitutional tool into this controversial arena-the fun-
damental right of freedom of speech.35 Although these claims also
30. See Amusement Ass'n, supra note 29; see generally M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 4-
24; Zeigler, supra note 27, at 4, 7.
31. Although some municipalities and states levy taxes on the operation of amusement
devices such as video games, this Note will not discuss taxation issues. For an excellent
treatise on state and local taxation, see P. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND
LocAL TAXATION (1981).
32. Courts will probably invalidate regulation of coin-operated amusement devices
such as video games when the asserted rationale for regulation is to prohibit or control
gambling. Zeigler, supra note 27, at 7-8. In recent years, courts uniformly have ruled that
when a player obtains a high score and a game replay through skill rather than chance, "the
coin-operated game is not a 'gambling device' or 'game of chance.'" Id. at 8. For example, in
WNEK Vending and Amusements Co. v. City of Buffalo, 107 Misc. 2d 353, 434 N.Y.S.2d
608 (1980), the New York state court applied this rationale and held that video games are
not gambling devices because a successful performance depends upon the player's "skill,
aptitude, co-ordination and concentration." Id. at 358, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 613. Thus, the court
held that the city license director's ruling that video games fell within the purview of the
Buffalo gambling ordinance was arbitrary and his application of this ordinance to WNEK
Vending was an abuse of administrative discretion. Id. at 361, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
33. See Zeigler, supra note 27, at 4-6. The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution
provides in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
State constitutional issues also arise in these cases. See, e.g., Aladdin's Castle v. City of
Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd in part and remanded, 455 U.S. 283 (1982),
opinion extended, 713 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1983).
34. See Zeigler, supra note 27, at 4-6.
35. See, e.g., America's Best Family Showplace v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 170
(E.D.N.Y. 1982). The first amendment to the Constitution provides in relevant part: "Con-
gress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. L The Supreme Court made the first amendment applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment due process clause in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
666 (1925). In Gitlow, Justice Sanford stated:
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the
press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgement by Con-
gress-are among the fundamental personal rights and "liberties" protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.
Id. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
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have produced judicial disagreement, the freedom of speech chal-
lenge promises to provide commercial video game purveyors with
their most potent and direct constitutional weapon in the quest for
reasonable municipal regulation of this immensely popular form of
entertainment.
This Note proposes that video game software, the driving
force of all video game entertainment, is an artistic creation of a
video game designer. Because the United States Supreme Court re-
peatedly has recognized that artistic expression and entertainment
are forms of expression that the first amendment protects, video
game software deserves first amendment protection. Video game
software is the "heart and soul""8 of the video game, and first
amendment protection, therefore, also should blanket the game it-
self. Accordingly, free "speech" liberties give video game manufac-
turers, distributors, and operators a fundamental right to purvey
the protected expression; and the public a fundamental right of
access to video games. In establishing the foundation for this argu-
ment, part H of this Note surveys the various methods of regulat-
ing video games through licensing and zoning. Part HI discusses
limitations on municipal police power regulation and the chal-
lenges that parties have brought against municipal video game or-
dinances. Freedom of speech constraints on municipal regulation
and the recent freedom of speech challenges to New York City
video game ordinances receive particular emphasis. Part IV argues
that video games are artistic entertainment deserving first amend-
ment protection. This argument presents empirical evidence which
demonstrates that video game software is an artistic expression.
Part IV also discusses the fundamental values that the first
amendment serves and free speech cases in the entertainment, of-
fensive speech, and obscenity areas which justify first amendment
protection of artistic expression. Finally, part IV analyzes first
amendment precedent in the area of artistic entertainment and the
antiquated requirement that entertainment must communicate
ideas or information to receive first amendment protection. It con-
cludes that protection of video games is a logical and warranted
step in first amendment doctrine. Part V summarizes this Note's
conclusions and briefly discusses the implications of first amend-
ment analysis on municipal licensing and zoning regulation of com-
mercial video game entertainment.
36. Wall St. J., supra note 3, at 1.
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II. LocAL GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF VIDEO GAMES
Local governments have designed a variety of regulatory
schemes in response to the problems that accompany large scale
public video game use in commercial establishments. These regula-
tions primarily consist of zoning and licensing ordinances, and
many municipalities subject video game arcades to more pervasive
regulation than other commercial businesses that install video
game machines as accessories to their primary businesses.3 7 Munic-
ipalities adopt this approach because they often believe that con-
centrating machines in an arcade causes more extensive use, con-
gregation of more game users, and exacerbation of perceived
problems."8
A. Zoning Regulation
Zoning regulations are the most effective method of land-use
control that local governments employ. Because they are part of a
municipality's state-granted police power,4 ° zoning regulations
must further the health, morality, safety, or general welfare of the
municipality's residents. 41 A municipality zones by dividing the
land within its boundaries into districts that reflect the nature and
extent of allowable land-use and the architectural and structural
requirements of buildings within each district.42 Zoning regulations
preserve the character of neighborhoods by banning the land uses
that municipalities perceive will cause these neighborhoods to de-
teriorate.'3 In recent years, municipalities increasingly have used
zoning controls to further preservation of historic landmarks and
to accomplish environmental and aesthetic objectives."
1. Video Game Arcades Permitted by Right
Many municipalities pass zoning ordinances that permit video
game arcades by right.'5 Such an ordinance encompasses video
37. M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 3.
38. Id.
39. IA C. ANT u, supra note 23, at § 7.00.
40. Id. See supra note 23.
41. 1A C. ANT=Au, supra note 23, at § 7.00.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. See generally Rowlett, Aesthetic Regulation Under the Police Power: The
New General Welfare and the Presumption of Constitutionality, 34 V~m. L. REv. 603
(1981).
45. M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 4.
1232 [Vol. 36:1223
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game arcades by defining commercial and recreational facilities in
extremely broad terms.48 The ordinance then designates the areas
within the municipality in which such facilities may locate.4" Santa
Cruz, California, for example, defines a "Commercial Recreational
Facility" as a "recreation facility operated as a business and open
to the general public. '4 The Santa Cruz ordinance then permits
"Commercial Recreational Facilities" to locate in all business dis-
tricts within the community.
49
Zoning ordinances that permit certain uses by right frequently
include compulsory aesthetic standards that mitigate the harsh ef-
fects of a commercial land use on surrounding residential neigh-
borhoods. For example, Joliet, Illinois, prohibits a nonresidential
use of land on "a lot that adjoins or faces any residential district"
until the potential user submits an acceptable "screening plan" to
the local building inspector.50 Joliet further defines "screening"
generally as a barrier of fencing or shrubbery that partially or com-
pletely obstructs "the view of unattractive structures or activities,"
absorbs or deflects sound, and contains litter and debris.51
2. Video Game Arcades as Conditional or Special Uses
Local communities may impose stricter regulations upon video
game arcades by defining them as conditional or special uses that
must comply with stringent locational standards. 2 Two variations
of the conditional use exist. First, municipalities may define video
game arcades as a conditional land use and review an establish-





50. Id. at 5.
51. Id.
52. Id. See generally 1A C. ANTAu, supra note 23, at § 7.107 (quoting State ex rel
Skelly Oil Co. v. Delafield, 58 Wis. 2d 695, 700-01, 207 N.W.2d 585, 587 (1973)). In Dela-
field, the Wisconsin court explained municipal use of conditional use zoning as follows:
Conditional uses or as they are sometimes referred to, special exception uses, enjoy
acceptance as a valid and successful tool of municipal planning on virtually a universal
scale. Conditional uses have been used in zoning ordinances as flexibility devices, which
are designed to cope with situations where a particular use, although not inherently
inconsistent with the use classification of a particular zone, may well create special
problems and hazards if allowed to develop and locate as a matter of right in a particu-
lar zone.




cable to all conditional uses.53 The village of Huntington, New
York, for example, treats video game arcades as a general condi-
tional use, and requires them to apply to the village's Board of
Appeals for a special use permit. Before issuing a special use per-
mit, the Board must find that the proposed use:
1. Will be properly located in regard to transportation, water supply,
waste disposal, fire protection, and other facilities;
2. Will not create undue traffic congestion or traffic hazard;
3. Will not adversely affect the value of property, character of the neigh-
borhood, or the pattern of development;
4. Will encourage an appropriate use of land consistent with the needs of
the town;
5. Will not impair the public health or safety, and will be reasonably
necessary for the public health or general welfare and interest."
The Board also considers other factors, such as the location and
height of buildings, the necessity for landscaping, and the potential
for noise, to determine whether to impose additional land-use re-
quirements on the special permit applicant. 55
Under the second variation of the conditional use, municipali-
ties may review an arcade's permit application pursuant to stan-
dards responsive to the specific local problems that commercial
video game use creates.5 San Gabriel, California, for example, en-
acted a combined zoning and licensing scheme that requires video
game arcades to fulfill a set of strict application procedures to ob-
tain a two-year use permit.57 The San Gabriel reviewing board con-
siders the arcade's location, potential for noise, internal layout,
and adequacy of adult supervision and parking to determine
whether to grant a special use permit.58
3. Video Games as Accessory Uses
An accessory land use is incidental or secondary to a primary
use but is so necessary or common that courts will not construe a
zoning ordinance to prevent it. 59 Before a municipality issues a
permit for an accessory use, the applicant generally must demon-
strate that the proposed accessory use is subordinate to a primary
53. M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 5.
54. Id. at 6.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 7.
58. Id.
59. 1A C. ANTiBAU, supra note 23, at § 7.85.
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use.e0 Accessory use zoning laws, which municipalities often use to
regulate video games as accessory uses in retail establishments,
typically limit the number of video game machines permissible in
any one business to between two and six.2 Municipalities often
employ accessory use zoning laws in conjunction with licensing reg-
ulations and other zoning laws that permit video games by right in
designated locations,3 and with zoning provisions that regulate
video games as a special or conditional use.es In addition, localities
that completely ban video game arcades as separate businesses
sometimes permit video games as an accessory use in other estab-
lishments Such as restaurants, shopping centers, and taverns." In
Islip, New York, for example, zoning laws restrict video games to
accessory uses within the business districts. The Islip zoning laws
define "Game Centers" as establishments containing a maximum
of three electronic video games or other similar games in which the
player inserts money into the machines directly or pays an opera-
tor.' 5 The town's zoning laws allow Game Centers if such uses are
"clearly incidental to the principal use and do not include any ac-
tivity commonly conducted as a [primary] business." e Many mu-
nicipalities favor accessory use laws such as those in Islip, New
York, because they prohibit concentration of large numbers of ma-
chines, discourage congregation of large groups of players, and fa-
cilitate supervision of the establishments. e
60. Id. For cases discussing the meaning of accessory use, see Davis v. Pine Lumber
Co., 273 Cal. App. 2d 218, 223, 77 Cal. Rptr. 825, 828 (1969); Lawrence v. Zoning Bd. of
Appeals, 158 Conn. 509, 512-13, 264 A.2d 552, 554 (1969); Amarillo Lodge v. City of
Amarillo, 473 S.W.2d 264, 273 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
61. M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 8. See, e.g., America's Best Family Showplace v. City of
New York, 536 F. Supp. 170, 172 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (in which New York City licensing and
zoning ordinances allowed a maximum of four video games per commercial establishment in
certain municipal zones, but a greater number in other parts of the city contingent upon
acquisition of a special arcade license). Bloomfield, New Jersey, recently passed an ordi-
nance that allows only two amusement devices per establishment, unless the business can
justify adding more machines up to a total of four. Recent Development, State Regulation
of Electronic Game Machines, 11 J. L. & EDuc. 387 (1982) [hereinafter cited as State
Regulation].
62. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
64. M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 8.
65. Id. at 9.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 8.
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4. Special Standards for Establishments Offering Video Game
Entertainment
While many municipalities use zoning laws to regulate com-
mercial video games and video game arcades as permitted, 8 condi-
tional,6 1 or accessory uses,70 many cities also impose a variety of
additional standards on video game establishments.7 1 Municipali-
ties often enforce these standards in conjunction with licensing re-
quirements to attack the unique community problems that com-
mercial video game use raises, including the young age of players
and late arcade hours, arcade structure and space, litter control,
location, noise, parking, and inadequate supervision.
7
1
(a) Age of Players and Hours of Operation Standards
Many communities enforce age and time regulations on video
game use by minors to curb the problems of juvenile delinquency
and truancy.7 In Mesquite, Texas, for example, the city passed an
ordinance that prohibited children under the age of seventeen
from playing video game machines in commercial establishments
unless an adult accompanied them. The Fifth Circuit, however, in
Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite,4 invalidated this age
restriction as violative of both the Texas and United States consti-
tutional guarantees of due process and equal protection, and the
United States constitutional guarantee of freedom of association.75
The more specific age and time restrictions on video game play
that San Gabriel, California, enacted however, remain unchal-
lenged. The city limits operating hours of video game arcades on
Sunday through Thursday from 10:00 A.M. to 10:00 P.M., while
expanding them to between 10:00 A.M. and midnight on weekend
days.7 6 Additionally, the city prohibits all people under the age of
eighteen from entering or remaining on the premises of game ar-
68. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
71. M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 9.
72. Id. at 9-14.
73. Id. at 14.
74. 630 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd in part and remanded, 455 U.S. 283 (1982),
opinion extended, 713 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1983).
75. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d at 1038-44. The United States
Supreme Court remanded this case for the determination of whether the Texas Constitution
provides independent support for the Fifth Circuit's decision and thus allows the Court to
avoid the federal constitutional questions. 455 U.S. at 291-95.
76. M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 14.
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cades during public school hours of operation.7 7
(b) Arcade Space and Structural Standards
Many municipal zoning ordinances impose structural require-
ments on game arcades, including the minimum floor space and
number of restrooms that each establishment must have.7 8 Munici-
palities typically base these standards upon the number of video
game machines present in a business.7 For example, Paramus,
New Jersey, requires that arcades comply with the city's fire safety
code and maintain a minimum aisle width of thirteen feet between
rows of games.80 In addition, the city enforces specific space re-
quirements for each machine that vary with the number of players
who simultaneously can use the machine. Such regulations limit
the number of persons who can use an arcade at one time, and
consequently, reduce attendant problems such as noise, litter, and
inadequate parking. 1
(c) Arcade Location Standards
Locational zoning ordinances typically regulate video game es-
tablishments in two ways. First, zoning ordinances may restrict the
location of arcades to certain districts within a city, and second,
they may require such establishments to separate spacially from
more sensitive land uses such as churches, libraries, playgrounds,
and schools. 82 For example, an Akron, Ohio, zoning ordinance pro-
hibits operation of amusement devices, including video games,
within 500 feet of the real estate boundary of a school, public play-
ground, or library.8" Huntington Beach, California, however,
77. Id.
78. Id. at 11.
79. Id. The city of San Gabriel, California, requires all video game arcades to meet the
following space and structural standards as a prerequisite to operation:
Game machines shall be located no closer than 12 inches from any wall assembly sepa-
rating the arcade from any adjacent building or portion of a building. Where machines
are located along one side of an aisle, said aisle shall be a minimum of 66 inches in
width and shall be unobstructed. When machines are located on both sides of any aisle,
the aisle shall be not less than 90 inches in width and shall be unobstructed, and such
open areas shall be unobstructed. The maximum number of machines in any arcade





82. Id. at 9.
83. AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIRD ORDiNANcxs § 870.01.5(a) (1975) (amended 1981).
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adopted a much stricter zoning ordinance that prohibits the loca-
tion of a game arcade within one-half mile of any elementary, jun-
ior, or senior high school.
8 4
(d) Noise, Litter, and Parking Standards
Municipal regulations frequently impose noise restriction, lit-
ter control, and parking standards on commercial video game pur-
veyors.85 A San Gabriel zoning ordinance imposes very comprehen-
sive noise restriction regulations that require separation of arcades
from "adjacent occupiable areas" by walls that allow transmission
of only specified low levels of sound.8 The city of Mesquite, Texas,
passed a litter control regulation after it determined that young
video game players often caused this nuisance. 87 The ordinance re-
quires arcade owners to arrange with the city for daily waste dispo-
sal that will keep the arcade's property in safe and sanitary condi-
tion.88 Additionally, zoning laws in Paramus, New Jersey, and
84. M. Jaffee, supra note 15, at 9.
85. Id. at 9-10, 12.
86. Id. at 9-10. San Gabriel devised the following noise standards table:
Noise standard that
shall not be exceeded
Nature or character of Commercial Residential
intrusive noise areas areas
Cumulative period of 30 45 db 40 db
minutes in any hour
Cumulative period of 15 50 50
minutes in any hour
Cumulative period of 5 55 50
minutes in any hour
Cumulative period of 1 60 55
minute in any hour
Anytime 65 60
Id. at 10.
San Gabriel uses the following noise measurement procedure in enforcing its noise
standards:
Measurement Period and Sound Level Meter. For the purposes of enforcement of these
conditions, a sound level meter which satisfies the requirements of the American Na-
tional Standards Institute (ANSI), S1.4-1971 (or the most recent revision thereof) [or]
Type S2A meter shall be used. The measurement period shall be any one-hour period
during the hours of operation of the arcade.
87. Id. at 10-11.
88. Id.
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Mesquite, Texas, require arcades to provide a minimum number of
automobile parking spaces in accordance with the number of game
machines that the arcade operates. Some cities also require arcades
to provide bicycle parking for their youthful customers.8 9
(e) Adult Supervision Standards
Many local ordinances require commercial video game purvey-
ors to supervise juveniles who patronize their establishments and
to post signs specifying the restrictions to which minors must ad-
here when playing the games.90 Huntington Beach, California, for
example, requires at least one supervisory employee over the age of
eighteen to be on duty during all operating hours.91 San Gabriel,
California, also requires owners to post easily observable signs in
the arcade that state in two inch letters the city's law against
smoking and consuming alcoholic beverages in arcades.2 These or-
dinances usually reflect the local community's concern for protect-
ing its youth.98
B. Licensing Regulation
1. Licensing and Zoning Distinguished
In addition to zoning regulations, local governments also regu-
late video games by requiring commercial game operators to obtain
a license or permit.' 4 Municipal administration of licensing and
zoning regulations follow similar procedures. Both require that
prospective land users apply to the local government for permis-
sion to operate, and that they comply with certain local stan-
dards.95 A licensing ordinance, however, may also require public
officials to investigate an applicant's moral character, prior police
record, education, skill, and competence as a precondition to li-
89. Id. at 12.
90. Id. at 13.
91. Id. (citing Huntington Beach, Cal., Ordinance 2539 (Jan. 1982)).
92. M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 14.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 15. As with other forms of municipal regulation, a municipality may regulate
through licensing only if state constitutional provisions, state statutory provisions, or its
local charter expressly or implicitly authorizes it to do so. See supra note 23; see also 3 C.
ANTIRAU., supra note 23, at § 24.00 (citing Nugent v. City of East Providence, 103 R.I. 518,
523, 238 A.2d 758, 761 (1968), and City of Chicago v. Drogasawacz, 256 IM. 34, 35-36, 99 N.E.
869, 870 (1912)).
95. M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 15.
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cense issuance. Such investigation is permissible only if these mat-
ters reasonably relate to acceptable performance of the regulated
activity. 8 Unlike zoning approval of an applicant's land use, how-
ever, which generally extends over the duration of the activity, a
license is effective for only a specified period, after which the licen-
see must apply for renewal.9 7 Periodic renewal affords local com-
munities the intermittent opportunity to reevaluate the licensee's
effect on surrounding neighborhoods.9 8 Additionally, the licensee
generally must pay a reasonable license fee for its land use privi-
lege.99 These fees defray the municipalities' costs of regulating li-
censed activities.100
Due process of law mandates that municipal ordinances "re-
96. 3 C. ANTIu, supra note 23, at §§ 24.17-19.
97. M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 15; 3 C. ANTIAU, supra note 23, at § 24.28. A munici-
pality may require license renewal on a daily basis. Id. (citing Commonwealth ex rel. Hines
v. Winfree, 408 Pa. 128, 182 A.2d 698 (1962)).
98. M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 15.
99. Id. at 23. The Department of Planning, Environment, and Development, in Brook-
haven, New York, analyzed the licensing fees that Long Island communities charge per
video game machine in commercial establishments within their cities. The study showed the
following:
Annual Fees Per Machine
Town Fees
Long Beach $ 11
Port Jefferson $ 25
Village of Babylon $ 50
Patchogue $ 50
Irvington $100
Id. Courts generally presume licensing fees are reasonable if the fees are not significantly
greater than the related regulatory expenses that the city incurs. 3 C. ArJAU, supra note
23, at § 24.24. In 1962 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated:
In determining the reasonableness of the amount of a license fee two principles must
be borne in mind: (a) the party who claims that the amount of a license fee is unrea-
sonable has the burden of so proving and (b) in matters of this character municipalities
must be given reasonable latitude in fixing charges to cover anticipated expenses to be
incurred in the enforcement of the ordinance and all doubt should be resolved in favor
of reasonableness of the fee.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Hines v. Winfree, 408 Pa. at 136-37, 182 A.2d at 703).
Local governments generally may include in the amount of a licensing fee "the costs of
investigating the applicant, the expenses in connection with issuing the authorization, the
costs of all supervision connected with insuring that the license conforms to the applicable
rules and regulations, plus all other police charges reasonably related to the activity con-
trolled." 3 C. ANTmAU, supra note 23, at § 24.24.
100. 3 C. ANTAU, supra note 23, at § 24.24.
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quiring licenses, permits and certificates be clear and certain as to
whom they apply and what obligations" they impose.101 Also, "li-
censing ordinances can not leave to the whim or discretion of a
local official or board the matter of determining what" the ordi-
nances prohibit, 10 2 "nor can they by the absence of all or reasona-
ble standards permit official action denying such permits, licenses,
or certificates at the arbitrary will of the public servant."103 Licens-
ing and zoning ordinances, therefore, essentially must be reasona-
ble expressions of the municipality's police power and relate rea-
sonably to furtherance of "the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare" of its citizens.104
2. Video Game Licensing Standards
Although the application procedure to acquire a license for op-
erating video games resembles the procedural requirements for
zoning law approval of commercial video game operation, some
unique characteristics that arise from municipalities' desires to
scrutinize moral background accompany license applications. Two
major reasons for the sensitive and exhaustive inquiries which mu-
nicipalities make are that the principal users of video game devices
often are adolescents 0 5 and that municipalities often suspect or-
ganized crime of having ties to the video game business.108 Thus,
ordinances usually require the applicant to list all previous crimi-
nal convictions on the video game license application, and the ordi-
nances sometimes require applicants to submit fingerprints to a
101. Id. at § 24.04 (citing Barker Bros., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 603, 76
P.2d 97 (1938)).
102. Id. (citing Junglen v. Board of Review, 184 Colo. 59, 518 P.2d 826 (1974)).
103. Id. (citing Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939)).
104. Id. at § 24.02; M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 16-17.
105. M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 17. See 3 C. ANeriAu, supra note 23, at §§ 24.17-.19
(municipality's inquiry into the applicant's moral character, reputation, criminal record, ed-
ucation, skill, competence, and experience).
106. M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 18. Mesquite, Texas, for example, will deny a video
game license application if a person who holds a substantial interest in the applicant's busi-
ness has a "connection with criminal elements." Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite,
630 F.2d at 1034 n.6, 1035 n.10. The Mesquite ordinance further provides:
A determination by the United States Department of Justice that a party is a member
of the "mafia" or "Cosa Nostro" family or that such party is engaged in or affiliated
with a nation-wide crime organization, whether formally or informally, shall be prima
facie [sic] evidence, so far as the issuance of a license hereunder, that such person has
"connections with criminal elements" and constitute, within the meaning of this ordi-
nance, "criminal elements."
Mesquite, Tex., Ordinance 1353 (Feb. 7, 1977).
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municipal law enforcement officer. 107 Some applications also re-
quire the applicant to compile a record of the prior criminal con-
victions of the machine distributors, business partners, and corpo-
rate officers, directors, and shareholders who participate in the
arcade's operations.0 '
Local video game licensing regulations, like zoning ordinances,
impose age and time, locational, structural and space, and number
of machines restrictions upon establishments offering video game
entertainment. 10 9 In addition, some communities employ licensing
techniques to regulate the "type and nature" of video game de-
vices.110 For example, Des Plaines, Illinois, passed a licensing ordi-
nance that restricted the number of replays video game machines
could award and prohibited the wagering of money on video game
plays because of concern over gambling and loitering in video game
establishments.111
3. Administration of Video Game Licensing
The administrative procedures concerning application for and
issuance of licenses are relatively simple.112 The license applicant
usually submits an application form to a municipal clerk or the
municipality's mayor, who then sends it to a city law enforcement
officer for review.113 The law enforcement officer, typically the
chief of police, evaluates the information, including any criminal
records, and makes a recommendation to the mayor or clerk.
114
The mayor or clerk then reviews the application, the police officer's
recommendation, and the municipality's other licensing require-
ments to decide whether to grant or deny the applicant's re-
quest.11' Legal problems sometimes arise from the denial, violation,
revocation, or suspension of a license.116
107. M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 17.
108. Id. at 17-18. See, e.g., Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d at 1035
n.10.
109. M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 18-21. See supra note 73-84 and accompanying text.
110. M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 19.
111. Id.
112. 3 C. ANTmAU, supra note 23, at § 24.25.
113. M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 21.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 3 C. ANTAu, supra note 23, at §§ 24.30-.40.
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(a) Denial of a License
Local governments, even under a valid ordinance, may not
deny "arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably" an application for
a governmental license.117 A West Virginia court, for example, in-
validated as arbitrary and unlawful a municipality's denial of a
poolroom license because the municipality based its decision on
parental complaints that "boys were spending too much time and
money in poolrooms."' " The court determined that the municipal-
ity's reaction to the complaints was unreasonable.119
Municipalities also must justify denial of a license as necessary
to protect the health, morals, safety, and general welfare of their
citizens. Courts usually will find unreasonable a municipality's de-
nial of a license if the denial infringes upon fundamental rights
such as freedom of speech or religion. 120
(b) Revocation of a License
The authority to revoke a license typically coincides with the
power to grant it.12' Because licenses generally contain no property
or contractual rights that prevent revocation, a local government
can revoke them when necessary to protect the welfare of its citi-
117. Id. at § 24.15.
118. Id. (citing Hardman v. Town of Glenville, 102 W. Va. 94, 134 S.E. 467 (1926),
overruled on other grounds, 109 W. Va. 653 (1930)).
119. Id. (citing V.S.H. Realty, Inc. v. Gendron, 338 A.2d 143 (Me. 1975)).
120. Id. (citing Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939); Sellers v. Johnson,
163 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 851 (1948)). See generally Monaghan,
First Amendment "Due Process", 83 HAnv. L. Rav. 518, 539-43 (1970). For example, in
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969), the Birmingham City Commis-
sion refused to grant the petitioner, a black minister, a parade permit to lead an orderly
civil rights march. The Birmingham ordinance gave the commission discretion to approve or
disapprove an applicant's permit request contingent upon its sole determination of whether
granting the permit would or would not harm the "public welfare, peace, safety, health,
decency, good order, morals or convenience." Id. at 149. City police subsequently arrested
the petitioner when he conducted the civil rights march without a permit. Id. The United
States Supreme Court held the ordinance facially invalid because it gave the commission
unbridled authority to issue or deny parade permits without reference to the legitimate pur-
poses underlying regulation of public streets and sidewalks. Id. at 151, 155-59. The Court
emphasized that when a person confronts an unconstitutional licensing ordinance, that per-
son "may ignore it and engage with impunity in the exercise of the right of free expression
for which the law purports to require a license." Id. at 151 (citing Lovell v. Griffen, 303 U.S.
444, 452-53 (1938); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 159, 165 (1939); Largent v. Texas, 318
U.S. 418, 419, 422 (1943); Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 602 (1942) (Stone, C.J.,
dissenting), adopted per curiam on rehearing, 319 U.S. 103, 104 (1943); Staub v. City of
Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 319 (1958); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1965)).
121. 3 C. ANTIEAU, supra note 23, § 24.36.
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zens. 122 Thus, municipalities may revoke licenses if an applicant
procures them "through misrepresentations of material facts, fraud
and deceit, or bad faith. ' 12 3 Municipalities also may revoke licenses
when licensees do not conduct their activities in accordance with
their original statement of purpose to the city, or when the munici-
pality issues the license illegally, without proper authority, or
under mistake of fact.1 24 In such cases, the municipality may re-
voke the license even though the applicant has expended funds or
acted in reliance upon it. Courts often justify this policy on the
grounds that improperly granted licenses are void from their
inception.
1 25
To comply with constitutional due process standards and
avoid litigation, municipalities often adopt elaborate license revo-
cation procedures.128 For example, an Irvington, New York, ordi-
nance requires the village clerk, within five days after a decision to
revoke a license, to notify the licensee in writing of the reasons for
this determination and the date that the revocation becomes effec-
tive.12 7 Upon receipt of this notice, the licensee has five days to
submit a written request for a hearing before the village hearing
panel to determine the appropriateness of the revocation. The vil-
lage must hold a hearing within five days after the request, pre-
serve a tape recorded record, and decide the issue by a majority
vote. Cities find such procedures a desirable way to ensure proce-
dural fairness, especially in controversial regulatory areas such as
122. Id. (citing Restaurants of Wichita, Inc. v. City of Wichita, 215 Kan. 636, 527 P.2d
969 (1974)). In Restaurants of Wichita the Kansas Supreme Court stated:
It is the general rule that there is no contract or vested right of property in a
license or permit as against the power of the state or a municipality to revoke it for
cause or in the exercise of the police power to protect the public health, safety, morals,
or welfare.
Restaurahts of Wichita, Inc. v. City of Wichita, 215 Kan. at 639-40, 527 P.2d at 972.
123. 3 C. ANTImAU, supra note 23, § 24.36 (citing Bentrovato v. Crinnion, 206 Misc.
648, 133 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1954)).
124. 3 C. ANTIEAU, supra note 23, § 24.36.
125. Id. (quoting Maurice Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. Cooley, 126 Vt. 9, 220 A.2d 467,
(1966)). In Cooley the Vermont court stated:
A permit for a use prohibited by a valid zoning ordinance, regulation or restriction
is void, of no effect and subject to revocation. This is true although the permit has been
issued under a mistake of fact. Such permit, void in its inception, may be revoked
notwithstanding that permittee may have acted upon it, and any expenditures made in
reliance upon such permit are made at his peril. The public has an interest in zoning
which cannot be set at naught by the unauthorized acts of its officers.
Maurice Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. Cooley, 126 Vt. at 11, 220 A.2d at 468-69 (citations
omitted).
126. M. Jaffee, supra note 15, at 21.
127. Id. at 21-22.
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video game licensing.
12 8
(c) Penalties for Abuse of a License
Violation of the regulations underlying licenses often results in
suspension or revocation of the licensee's privileges.129 Video game
ordinances, however, frequently make a license violation a misde-
meanor, which subjects the licensee to fines and sometimes impris-
onment.130 For example, the Department of Planning, Environ-
ment, and Development in Brookhaven, New York, recently
conducted a survey of penalty provisions in video game licensing
ordinances that Long Island communities had enacted. The survey
revealed that the maximum penalties for violation of the surveyed
ordinances ranged from $250 to $500 and, in one community, up to
six months imprisonment.
1 3 1
HI. RECENT CHALLENGES TO ORDINANCES THAT REGULATE VIDEO
GAMEs
Commercial purveyors of video game entertainment judicially
have attacked increasing municipal video game regulation with a
variety of constitutional weapons. These challenges have character-
ized video game ordinances as arbitrary and capricious exercises of
local police power,1 3 2 and as violations of state or federal due pro-
128. Id.
129. See 3 C. ANTiEAU, supra note 23, §§ 24.35-.36.
130. M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 23.
131. Id.
132. State and federal courts generally presume local government regulation of eco-
nomic interests such as commercial video game entertainment, undertaken pursuant to rea-
sonable exercises of state-granted police power, to be valid under the fourteenth amend-
ment. See supra note 23. The "'police power' encompasses the inherent right of state and
local governments to enact legislation protecting the health, safety, morals or general wel-
fare of the people within their jurisdiction." J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 389 (1978). When municipalities enact legislation pursuant to a
reasonable exercise of their broad police power, courts refuse to substitute their opinion
regarding the wisdom of the legislation for that of the enacting local government. See, e.g.,
Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n, Inc., 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941)
("We are not concerned ... with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation.").
Consequently, courts give state and local governments virtually unlimited discretion in
promulgating economic legislation for the purposes and ends they deem desirable. Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-32 (1963). Courts adhere to this policy even though the regula-
tion incidentally causes other arguably improper effects. 372 U.S. at 731. See Ziegler,
Trouble in Outer Galactica: The Police Power, Zoning, and Coin-Operated Video Games,
34 SYRAcUSE L. REv. 453 (1983), for a comprehensive discussion of local video game regula-
tion instituted pursuant to the police power and zoning authority of municipalities.
Some commercial purveyors of video game entertainment have challenged municipal
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cess,133 equal protection,'8 freedom of association,3 5 and freedom
video game legislation on grounds that it was an arbitrary and capricious exercise of munici-
pal police power. See, e.g., Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. Village of North Riverside, 66 IM. App.
3d 542, 383 N.E. 2d 1316 (1978); Supercade Cherry Hill, Inc. v. Borough of Eatontown, 178
N.J. Super. 152, 428 A.2d 530 (1981); America on Wheels, Eatontown, Inc. v. Board of Ad-
justment, 178 N.J. Super. 155, 428 A.2d 532 (1981). Although courts generally presume mu-
nicipal ordinances enacted pursuant to validly granted state police powers to be valid, see
supra note 23, these cases indicate that state courts do not treat this presumption equally.
See, e.g., Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. Village of North Riverside, 66 MII. App. 3d 542, 383 N.E.
2d 1316 (1978) (court rejected challenge to ordinances that prohibited amusement device
operators from allowing games to award replays and that prohibited persons under eighteen
years of age from playing the games); Supercade Cherry Hill, Inc. v. Borough of Eatontown,
178 N.J. Super. 152, 428 A.2d 530 (1981) (court sustained challenge to ordinance barring
amusement machines); America on Wheels, Eatontown, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 178
N.J. Super. 155, 428 A.2d 532 (1981) (court invalidated zoning ordinances barring amuse-
ment arcades from certain zoning districts and limiting the number of machines installed as
incidental uses). See also Ziegler, supra, at 470, 485-90.
133. Even if a local government enacts an ordinance pursuant to its police powers,
persons may challenge it under the due process clause of the federal constitution if there is
no reasonable relationship between the municipality's regulatory method and the ordi-
nance's purpose.
Today, federal courts provide very deferential review to substantive due process chal-
lenges to federal, state, and local economic legislation. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, supra note 132, at 404-10; L. TRmE, AMEMCA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 450-55 (1978).
State and federal courts, however, have reached different results depending in part upon
whether they apply very deferential federal standards of due process scrutiny, see, e.g.,
America's Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 170 (E.D.N.Y.
1982) (court applied federal rational basis test and upheld video game licensing and zoning
laws), or more liberty protective state standards; see, e.g., Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of
Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd in part and remanded in part, 455 U.S. 283
(1982), opinion extended, 713 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1983) (on remand the court held that the
ordinance violated the due process clause of the Texas Constitution, which gives substantive
economic rights broader protection than the federal constitution does).
134. Under federal standards, courts rarely sustain equal protection challenges to eco-
nomic regulations unless the regulation impinges upon a fundamental right, Kelley v. John-
son, 425 U.S. 238, 247-48 (1976), or draws an irrational or inherently "suspect" classifica-
tion. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 132, at 525. For an excellent discussion
of judicial disfavor of classifications based on "suspect" criteria, see Brest, Foreward: In
Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 98 HARv. L. Rzv. 1 (1976). Again, however,
some state courts have shown heightened sensitivity toward these claims by applying more
protective state constitutional standards. See infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text. In
America's Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 170 (E.D.N.Y.
1982), the plaintiff argued that a municipality's video game regulatory scheme created two
impermissible classifications: (1) commercial video game purveyors offering fewer than five
video games and those offering five or more video games, and (2) the prohibited amusement
arcade use in the plaintiff's zoning district and those commercial entertainment uses permit-
ted within its district, such as "incidental musical entertainment by mechanical device" or
three-piece live band. Id. at 175. The court accepted that the four video game device limit
represented the city council's reasonable judgment as to the maximum level of congestion,
noise, and traffic allowable to maintain stable commercial neighborhoods. The court empha-
sized that although the effects of such line drawing must be somewhat arbitrary, they are
not, therefore, unreasonable. Id. at 175. The court also upheld as reasonable the city's judg-
ment that limited live entertainment would not attract as large a number of people for a
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of speech.136 Judicial decisions have varied, largely because the in-
volved ordinances differ significantly and because state constitu-
tions offer different amounts of protection to individual liberties.
1 3 7
short period of time as would a video game arcade. The court felt that slower turnover of
audiences listening to live entertainment justified the city's conclusion that live entertain-
ment does not cause the seem degree of noise and congestion as do video game arcades. Id.
See Zeigler, supra note 132, at 493-96, for a discussion of equal protection analysis in
video game ordinance cases.
135. Freedom of association is a fundamental right that arises from the penumbras of
the first amendment and the due process clauses of the first and fourteenth amendments.
The right of free association protects associational activities that deal with economic, see,
e.g., United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-25 (1967), familial,
see, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), intimate, see, e.g., Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965), and political objectives. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1976). The Supreme Court also has suggested in dicta that freedom of
association protects individuals from invidious discriminatory regulation of social associa-
tion, such as formation of and membership in social clubs. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery,
417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974). Consequently, when laws restrict free association rights, courts
apply strict scrutiny to determine whether the laws are constitutional See, e.g., Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
In Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029, (5th Cir. 1980), the Fifth
Circuit drew on the Supreme Court's social association dicta and other Fifth Circuit prece-
dent which held that the right to associate protects social interaction on street comers, see
Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 1980), to extend this protection to the
association of minor children in a video game arcade. The Fifth Circuit then invalidated on
free association, due process, and equal protection grounds the Mesquite video game ordi-
nance that prohibited persons under the age of seventeen from playing coin-operated
amusement games unless accompanied by an adult or legal guardian. Aladdin's Castle, 630
F.2d at 1041-42.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens remanded the freedom of association,
substantive due process, and equal protection aspects of the Fifth Circuit's opinion for clari-
fication. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 291-95. Justice Stevens
took this action because the Fifth Circuit's opinion seemed to base the court's actions on
both Texas and federal constitutional law. Justice Stevens noted that, if this observation
were true, the Court would have no jurisdiction to review these issues. Id. Justice Stevens,
however, commented that the Fifth Circuit relied upon Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412, 415 (1920), in its substantive due process and equal protection analysis, and that
this standard of judicial review was not necessarily the standard the Court would currently
apply. Aladdin's Castle, 455 U.S. at 294.
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit invalidated the Mesquite age
ordinance on state constitutional grounds, but it did not utilize its freedom of association
analysis. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 701 F.2d 524, 529-31. Thus, the novelty
and importance of the court's free association analysis seems diminished.
136. See infra notes 173-213 and accompanying text.
137. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv.
L. Rav. 489, 495 (1977). When state courts base their decisions on state constitutional law,
the Supreme Court is completely without jurisdiction to review these decisions. Brennan,
supra, at 501. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). For other
discussions of this issue, see Falk, The Supreme Court of California 1971-1972, Foreward,
The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALn. L. Rav.
273 (1973); Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger
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All states must provide the minimum level of protection that the
federal constitutional law establishes, but some states are more
protective of individual liberties.3 8 This constitutional law phe-
nomenon is partially responsible for the differing responses that
state and federal courts have given due process and equal protec-
tion challenges to video game ordinances. 3 9 If, however, the fed-
eral courts grant first amendment protection to video games, the
disparate treatment will diminish and state courts will have to ac-
cord video games a substantially higher minimum standard of con-
stitutional protection than they do currently.
A. The First Amendment
Commercial video game purveyors fighting to obtain and
maintain reasonable municipal regulation of video game entertain-
ment recently raised an extremely controversial, direct, and poten-
tially potent constitutional shield against municipal regulation.
This protection is the first amendment's fundamental right of free-
dom of speech.140 Controversy surrounds the novel question that
this first amendment approach poses: whether a video game is an
artistic expression and a form of entertainment that the first
amendment protects. The free speech challenge is the most direct
one because it should require judicial consideration of the unique
artistic characteristics of video games and would protect the games
directly. Additionally, it would force courts to adjudge an ordi-
nance's constitutionality pursuant to an individual's right to cre-
ate, play, and purvey the games.14 1 Thus, this challenge would ap-
Court, 62 'VA. L. REv. 873 (1976); Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of
Rights, 8 H~Av. C.R.-C.L. L. Rxv. 271 (1973).
138. Brennan, supra note 137, at 498-503.
139. Compare Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1980),
rev'd in part and remanded in part, 455 U.S. 283 (1982), opinion extended, 713 F.2d 139
(5th Cir. 1983) and State v. Bloss, 62 Hawaii 147, 613 P.2d 354 (1980) with Malden Amuse-
ment Co., Inc. v. City of Malden, No. 82-8140-S (D. Mass. Jan. 25, 1983)(available Mar. 1,
1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) and America's Best Family Showplace Corp. v.
City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)(examples of courts applying different
levels of due process scrutiny).
140. See infra notes 141-73 and accompanying text.
141. Once a court holds that certain expressions deserve first amendment protection,
and that a speaker has a right to communicate or express them, the constitution protects
the right of the public to'know, and thus, to receive these expressions of information and
ideas. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALI. L. REv. 422,
464 (1980); see also Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q.
1. In First Natl Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978), for example, Justice
Powell, writing for the majority, stated that the Court's recent commercial speech decisions
"illustrate that the First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-ex-
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ply to all video game cases, regardless of an ordinance's
provisions. 142 Due process, equal protection, and freedom of associ-
ation challenges, however, are less direct because they do not force
courts to examine the unique characteristics of video games, nor do
they attach constitutional protection directly to the games or the
games' creators. Rather, they protect only the rights of individuals
to play and purvey video games and, therefore, necessarily do not
apply to all cases. If successful, the freedom of speech challenge
also would be the most potent of constitutional protections be-
cause free speech is a fundamental right under the Bill of Rights,
and courts consequently would apply strict judicial scrutiny to
laws that trammel upon it. 4 s
1. Freedom of Speech and the Balancing Test
The presumption of validity that local government regulation
enjoys when it seeks to maintain satisfactory quality of life in ur-
ban and rural communities quickly fades when these laws infringe
the first amendment rights of free expression.14 4 A court's initial
inquiry in a first amendment analysis of local government regula-
tion is whether the regulated expression deserves first amendment
protection. If a court grants first amendment protection to a form
of expression, then the first amendment also grants individuals a
fundamental right to purvey and to know or have access to the
expression. Once a court determines that a municipal regulation
affects first amendment rights, the court weighs the following fac-
tors to determine the validity of the law: (1) the societal value of
pression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from
which members [of society] may draw." Justice Powell reasoned that protecting the public's
right of access to first amendment commercial speech furthers the" 'free flow of commercial
information."' Id. (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)). For further discussion by the Court of the right to
receive information and ideas principle, see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 542, 564 (1969);
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen.,
381 U.S. 301, 305-07 (1965).
Similarly, the first amendment protects the right of individuals to purvey or communi-
cate protected speech even though the purveyor is not the original speaker or creator of the
expression. For example, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), the Court
held that a drive-in motion picture theater operator had a first amendment right to purvey
motion pictures containing nudity. See id. at 211 n.7 (in which Justice Powell said, "At issue
here, however, is not the viewing rights of unwilling viewers but rather the rights of those
who operate drive-in theaters and the public that attends these establishments.").
142. See infra notes 217-31 and accompanying text.
143. See infra text accompanying notes 152-54.
144. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 77 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
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the restricted expression, 145 (2) the degree of the law's infringe-
145. Emerson, supra note 141, 68 CALIF. L. REv. at 451-54. The proposition that the
Burger Court weighs the social value of the regulated expression in its first amendment
scrutiny of challenged legislation is highly controversial. Professor William Van Alstyne, for
example, proposed the following graphic depiction of the different types of first amendment
expression and the various degrees of protection each receives:
Protection of the First Amendment By Subject
Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALM L. REV. 107, 140
(1982). At the center of Professor Van Alstyne's graphic illustration is political speech, such
as public criticism of governmental officials. Courts deem political speech critically impor-
tant to the proper functioning of the first amendment and, thus, accord it full first amend-
ment protection. Id. at 139. On outer perimeters of Professor Van Alstyne's graph lie porno-
graphic and commercial speech, which the Court has stated deserve less than full protection.
See Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976) (in which Justice Stevens
upheld a Detroit "Anti-Skid Row" ordinance that regulated adult movie theaters and stated
that "[T]here is surely a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition of [sexually explicit
nonobscene adult movies] that [are] on the borderline between pornography and artistic
1250
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ment upon the protected expression, 146 (3) the existence and suffi-
expression than in the free dissemination of ideas of social and political significance. . ....
In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), Justice Powell stated:
To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial
speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the
Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather than subject
the First Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial
speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in
the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be
impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 456. Other forms of obscene expression, such as
obscene movies and literature, do not receive first amendment protection. See Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
In the realm between pure political speech, which enjoys full first amendment protec-
tion, and pornographic expression which receives no protection, lies aesthetic, scientific,
philosophic, and economic expression. Van Alstyne, supra, at 140. As Professor Van Alstyne
suggests, whether these types of expression receive a lesser degree of first amendment pro-
tection is speculative at best; and the Court has provided no clear answer in recent years. Id.
at 141-42. Professor Thomas Emerson, however, argues that longstanding first amendment
theory forbids governments from making these types of value judgments. Emerson, supra
note 141, 68 CALnw. L. Ray. at 453-54. Arguably, therefore, this uncertain realm of expression
on Professor Van Alstyne's graphic illustration should receive full first amendment protec-
tion. For more comprehensive discussions of Court valuation of first amendment expression,
see A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNmENT (1948); Blasi, The
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. REsEARcH J. 521.
146. Emerson, supra note 141, 68 CALn?. L. Rav. at 453-54. In weighing this second
element in its balancing test, the Court generally will deny first amendment protection when
"[t]he impact of the government regulation, although substantial, is not deemed sufficient."
Id. at 453. In Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., for example, the Court upheld the
Detroit ordinance because it posed nothing more than a limitation on the place where the
respondent theater owner could exhibit adult films. 427 U.S. 50, 71-72 (1976). Moreover, the
Court relied on district court findings to reason that the burden on first amendment rights
was slight because many locations existed in Detroit that were over 1000 feet from another
regulated land use, and thus, permissible locations for adult theaters under the ordinance.
Id. at 71-72 n.35. Justice Powell, concurring, emphasized that even though the ordinance
created economic loss for the theater owner, the loss was not greater than that which other
commercial enterprises suffer at the hands of constitutionally valid zoning ordinances. Id. at
78 (citing Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927)). Justice Powell also argued
that first amendment inquiry does not concern itself "with economic impact; rather, it looks
only to the effect of this ordinance upon freedom of expression." Id.
An individual will enjoy full first amendment protection if a local ordinance causes a
substantial abridgement of first amendment rights. In Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim, the Court invalidated a Mount Ephraim ordinance that prohibited all live en-
tertainment, including live nude dancing, within its boundries, as a substantial and unjusti-
fied restriction on free speech. 452 U.S. 61, 72 (1981). Unlike the Detroit ordinance in Amer-
ican Mini Theaters, the Mount Ephraim ordinance did not regulate the location of adult
theaters. Instead, it made criminal the act of offering all live entertainment anywhere within
the borough. Id. at 65, 71. The Court also rejected the borough's argument that live nude
entertainment was amply available in nearby areas outside its limits and stated that "'one
is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the
plea that it may be exercised in some other place.' "Id. at 76-77 (quoting Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)).
Whether a local ordinance imposes a slight or substantial burden on free speech often is
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ciency of alternative channels of expression that the law leaves
open,147 and (4) the substantiality of the governmental interest
not clearly discernible on the face of the statute. Rather, the party who challenges the stat-
ute bears the burden at trial to prove by factual evidence the substantiality of an ordi-
nance's impingement upon free speech. For example, in Basiardanes v. City of Galveston,
682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982), the Fifth Circuit considered the validity of a Galveston ordi-
nance that, like the ordinance upheld in American Mini Theaters, restricted the operation
of adult theaters to certain designated areas within the city. Id. at 1209. Basiardanes, how-
ever, introduced into evidence maps of Galveston depicting the "oppressive options" that
the city's ordinance left for aspiring purveyors of adult films. Id. at 1214. The Court summa-
rized Basiardanes' evidence as follows:
In the ten percent to fifteen percent of the city not categorically banned, adult
theaters may operate only in the industrial zones at a great distance from other con-
sumer-oriented establishments. Few access roads lead to the permitted locations, which
are found among warehouses, shipyards, undeveloped areas, and swamps. These loca-
tions are poorly lit, barren of structures suitable for showing films, and perhaps unsafe.
In theory they are available to adult movie proprietors and patrons, but in fact they are
completely unsuited to this use.
Id. The district court held that the attractiveness of the permissible locations was irrelevant
and merely a "[R]easonable economic burden that befalls some activity in every land use
program." Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 514 F. Supp. 975, 982 (S.D. Tex. 1981). The
district court also relied on Justice Powell's concurring opinion in American Mini Theaters
to emphasize that an exclusive focus on economic impact is improper under first amend-
ment inquiry. Id. at 982 n.15 (citing Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. at 78
(Powell J., concurring)). The Fifth Circuit, however, struck down the Galveston ordinance as
a drastic impairment on protected speech because it rendered virtually impossible efforts by
a proprietor to open a theater and exhibit adult films or by patrons to attend. 682 F.2d at
1214. Thus, although the Galveston ordinance facially appeared to be a reasonable time,
place, or manner restriction that was permissible under the American Mini Theaters analy-
sis, the ordinance effectively imposed a substantial restriction on free speech that was un-
constitutional under the Schad standard of review. Id. at 1214-15.
147. Emerson, supra note 141, at 454. Even if an ordinance's purpose is legitimate and
furthers a substantial governmental interest, municipalities may not pursue that purpose by
means which broadly restrict first amendment rights when more narrowly restrictive means
can attain the same end. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 132, at 727. Courts
consider the existence of "less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose" when
analyzing the breadth of legislative restrictions. Id. (citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
488 (1960)). For example, in Shelton, the petitioner and other school teachers challenged
the constitutionality of an Arkansas statute that required all teachers, as a condition of
employment in a state school or college, "to file annually an affidavit listing without limita-
tion every organization to which he has belonged or regularly contributed within the preced-
ing five years." 364 U.S. at 480. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, stated that the
statute required the petitioner and other teachers "to list, without number, every conceiva-
ble kind of associational tie-social, professional, political, avocational, or religious." Id. at
488. Although the Court agreed that the state had a valid interest in investigating the com-
petence and fitness of the people it hired as teachers, id. at 485, the Court felt that many of
the relationships the state required teachers to reveal had "no possible bearing upon the
teacher's occupational competence or fitness." Id. at 488. The Court reasoned that the un-
limited and indiscriminate sweep of the statute "went far beyond what was necessary to
achieve [the state's] legitimate governmental purpose" and invalidated the statute as a
breach of the petitioner's fundamental right to freedom of association. Id. at 489. For other
examples of the Court's application of the least restrictive means test, see Village of
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which the law purports to further.14 8
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980); First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307-08
(1964); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Talley v. California, 362
U.S. 60 (1960); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 165 (1939).
148. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. at 68-70, (citing Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. at 161). For example, in Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976), the city of Detroit, Michigan, passed an amendment to an "Anti-Skid Row Ordi-
nance" that survived first amendment review by the Court. At trial the city introduced sub-
stantial evidence tending to justify its amendment. The Detroit ordinance regulated adult
theaters, a classification predicated upon the theater's exhibition of motion pictures "char-
acterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to 'Specified Sexual
Activities' or 'Specified Anatomical Areas,'. . ." Id. at 53 n.4. The city pursued its "anti-
skid row" purpose by requiring disbursement of adult theaters from each other and other
regulated uses. Id. at 52. Specifically, the ordinance prohibited adult theaters from locating
"within 1,000 feet of any two other 'regulated uses' or within 500 feet of a residential area."
Id. The respondent operated two adult theaters that the Detroit ordinance encompassed. Id.
at 55. Consequently, the respondent brought two separate actions seeking declaratory judg-
ment that the ordinance was unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement. Id.
Although respondents nonobscene adult movies enjoyed first amendment protection, the
Court held in the city's favor.
The city achieved this favorable decision by the introduction at trial of Detroit Com-
mon Council findings showing that clusters of adult theaters in small geographic areas were
injurious to surrounding neighborhoods and the city's urban renewal projects. Id. at 54 n.6.
The city also produced testimony by urban planners and real estate experts asserting that
the location of several regulated uses, including adult theaters, "in the same neighborhood
tends to attract an undesirable quantity and quality of transients, adversely affects property
values, causes an increase in crime, especially prostitution, and encourages residents and
business to move elsewhere." Id. at 55. The Court upheld the Detroit ordinance as constitu-
tional because the ordinance's dispersement requirement only minimally burdened the re-
spondent's free speech liberties and because Detroit articulated a sufficient basis for its law-
making decision. Id. 71-73.
Conversely, the city of Jacksonville, Florida, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205 (1975), failed to justify sufficiently its ordinance that invaded the petitioner's first
amendment right to exhibit nonobscene movies containing nudity at his drive-in theater.
The challenged Jacksonville ordinance made criminal the showing of "'any motion picture
... in which the human... bare buttocks, human female bare breasts, or human bare
pubic areas are shown, if [the exhibition] is visible from any public street or public place.'"
Id. at 207 (quoting JACKSoNviLLE, FLA., MUNICIPAL CODE § 330.313 (1972)). The petitioner
violated this ordinance by showing the film "Class of '74," id. at 206 n.1, which contained
some nudity and was visible from public streets. Id. at 206. The city argued primarily that it
designed the ordinance to protect its citizens, particularly children, against unwilling expo-
sure to offensive materials. Id. at 208, 212. At oral arguments before the Court, the city first
argued that nudity on a drive-in movie screen distracts passing motorists, slows traffic, and
increases the likelihood of automobile accidents. Id. at 214. Justice Powell, however, writing
for the majority, emphasized that a legislative classification which singled out and prohib-
ited movies containing the "most fleeting and innocent glimpses of nudity" was "strikingly
underinclusive." Id. at 214. Justice Powell hypothesized that a wide variety of other typical
movie scenes, "ranging from soap opera to violence," would equally distract passing motor-
ists. Id. at 215. The majority invalidated the Jacksonville ordinance because it facially infr-
inged first amendment rights. Id. at 208-17. See infra notes 157-67 and accompanying text.
Justice Powell stressed that the city failed to heed repeated Court warnings that attempts
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Commentators have criticized sharply the unpredictability of
the Supreme Court's application of this four part balancing test.
Professor Emerson argues that in most Burger Court applications
of this test, the scales could have tipped in favor of either party, as
the frequent and sharp division among Justices' opinions evi-
dences. 14 9 Professor Emerson capsulizes the common objections to
this balancing test as follows:
In essence, the balancing doctrine is no doctrine at all but merely a skeleton
structure on which to throw any facts, reasons, or speculations that may be
considered relevant. Not only are there no comparable units to weigh against
each other, but the test is so vague as to yield virtually any result in any
case.150 -
Regardless of the balancing test's vagueness and unpredict-
ability, the Court, in practice, subjects a challenged law to a high
degree of scrutiny analagous to due process and equal protection
tests concerning violations of a fundamental right or a "suspect"
classification.151 When the Court subjects a law to strict scrutiny
under the first amendment analysis, it carefully examines the soci-
etal importance of the objectives the government designed the law
to achieve, and determines whether the law actually furthers these
objectives through the least restrictive means possible. 52 Although
burdensome to governmental entities, this standard is not insur-
mountable. A municipality can pass the test by articulating and
empirically supporting a well-reasoned and significant basis for its
decision to enact the challenged legislation. Governments also
must prove that the law leaves reasonable alternative avenues for
continued communication of the restricted speech. 53
to regulate first amendment freedoms require precise legislative drafting and clearly articu-
lated and supported governmental purposes. Id. at 217-18.
149. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REv.
422, 451 (1980).
150. Id. at 440.
151. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
152. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. at 68-74.
153. See, e.g., id. at -72-73; Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 54-55, 71
n.34.
For some excellent discussions of the overbreadth doctrine, see G. GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1185-95 (10th ed. 1980); L. TREs, supra note 133, at
710-22; Monaghan, supra note 155; Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
HARv. L. REV. 844 (1970).
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2. The Overbreadth Doctrine
The overbreadth doctrine is an exception to traditional free
speech standing concepts. 1 4 It allows litigants whose act of expres-
sion falls "within the constitutionally valid applications" of certain
legislation to assert that legislation's "potentially invalid applica-
tions. . . to other persons not before the court and with whom the
litigant stands in no special relationship." 55
Historically, overbreadth attacks on legislation effectively have
protected freedom of expression.158 In these cases, courts do not
consider whether a particular litigant's expression deserves protec-
tion.157 Rather, they invalidate legislation entirely because of its
potential restriction on the protected speech of third parties not
before the court.158 The Supreme Court justifies this departure
from the traditional rules of standing on the ground that over-
154. The traditional standing doctrine in constitutional adjudication requires that a
litigant "has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial reso-
lution of that controversy. . . ." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972). In analyz-
ing standing questions, the Supreme Court considers whether the litigant "alleges that the
challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise;" and whether the
interest the litigant seeks to protect is within the category of interests that a legislature
designed the statute or constitutional guarantee in question to protect. L. TRmE, supra note
133, at 79-80 (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
152, 153 (1970) (emphasis added)). The "cases and controversy" limitation of article I1
mandates that a party show injury in fact and a "'fairly traceable' causal connection be-
tween the claimed injury and the challenged conduct." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975),
and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261 (1977)). See
Jaffe, The Citizen as a Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological
Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968); Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a
Constitutional Requirement? 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); see also L. TRmBE, supra note 133, at
80-97. The Constitution does not require courts to consider the standing issue of whether
the injured interests fall within the category of interests a certain statute or constitutional
provision protects. L. TRmE, supra note 133, at 99. Rather, this element of the standing
inquiry is a prudential consideration arising from various policies that concern the proper
and limited role of the federal courts in a democratic society. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envt'l Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. at 80. For example, the Court has denied standing when
a party asserts a generalized grievance that many citizens share in equal measure as an
injury. Id. (citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974)). The Court infrequently
grants standing when a party attempts to assert the legal rights of third parties. See, e.g.,
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960). The
Duke Power case, however, holds that if "a party champions his own rights," and the alleged
injury "is a concrete and particularized one" that the requested relief will prevent or re-
dress, then meeting the constitutional standing requirements generally will satisfy the pru-
dential concerns as well. 438 U.S. at 80-81.
155. Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. CT. Rav. 1, 1-2.
156. G. GUNTHER, supra note 153, at 1086.
157. Id. at 1187.
158. Id.
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broad laws will have a "chilling" effect on the speech of third par-
ties who are too timid to bring suit.1""
Although the overbreadth doctrine enjoyed immense popular-
ity during the Warren Court years, criticism of this technique grew
during the early 1970s. In Younger v. Harris,'10 Justice Black re-
stricted federal injunctive relief against laws that allegedly were
overbroad or vague on their face by stating that the federal judicial
power to adjudicate concrete disputes does not authorize courts
"to survey the statute books and pass judgment on laws before the
courts are called upon to enforce them."'161 Criticism of the tradi-
tional overbreadth doctrine intensified in subsequent Burger Court
opinions"" and finally gained majority support in Broadrick v.
Oklahoma.6 s In Broadrick, the Court enunicated the "substantial
overbreadth" doctrine, which emphasizes that courts should apply
the overbreadth technique hesitantly."6 " The Court limited the
"substantial overbreadth" doctrine further by making it inapplica-
ble in commercial speech cases, 6 5 and currently requires courts to
find a substantial number of constitutionally impermissible appli-
cations of a law before facially invalidating it on overbreadth
grounds.'66
159. Id. See Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 808
(1969).
160. 401 U.S. 37, 52 (1971).
161. Id.
162. G. GuNTHER, supra note 153, at 1190. See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402
U.S. 611, 617-21 (1971) (White, J., dissenting) (in which Justice White argued against apply-
ing the overbreadth doctrine against a Cincinnati ordinance that prohibited people from
assembling and "'conduct[ing] themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by
... .' ") (quoting CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCE § 901-L6 (1956)); Gooding v. Wil-
son, 405 U.S. 518, 530-1 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (in which Chief Justice Burger
emphasized that the Court should reserve application of the first amendment overbreadth
doctrine to cases in which challenged statutes demonstrated the potential for broad im-
proper applications that posed a significant likelihood of infringing important first amend-
ment expressions). In Gooding, Chief Justice Burger also argued, citing Justice Black's opin-
ion in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52-53 (1971), that application of the overbreadth
technique is improper when a statute poses only insubstantial or imagined potential for
occasional and isolated improper applications that impede protected constitutional liberties.
Gooding v. Wiison, 405 U.S. at 530-31.
163. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
164. Id. at 613.
165. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977).
166. New York v. Ferber, 50 U.S.L.W. 5077, 5084 (U.S. July 2, 1982).
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3. The Void For Vagueness Doctrine
The void for vagueness doctrine, a due process concept of spe-
cial importance in free speech context,17 is a close relative of the
overbreadth doctrine. Consequently, courts often confuse the two
concepts. 168 This confusion is understandable since both overbroad
and vague statutes chill the willingness of individuals to express
themselves freely. Both doctrines also can produce rulings of facial
invalidity.'- 9 The void for vagueness and overbreadth doctrines,
however, are distinguishable. To illustrate, a legislature could draft
a statute clearly and precisely, but the statute still might be imper-
missibly overbroad because its method of regulation is too perva-
sive and invades areas of protected expression.1 0
Because the vagueness doctrine encourages federal, state, and
local legislators to draft reasonably clear guidelines into their laws,
enforcement officials and triers of fact can avoid arbitrary and dis-
criminatory law enforcement. 7 1 Parties frequently challenge li-
censing and other ordinances requiring administrative officials to
exercise discretion before issuing a license as void for vagueness." 2
B. First Amendment Challenges to Ordinances That Regulate
Video Games
To date, the courts and parties that have considered whether
video games deserve first amendment protection have focused pri-
marily on the rights of individuals to purvey and play these games.
Unfortunately, they have ignored completely, or only slightly dis-
cussed, the argument that video game software is an artistic ex-
pression of a video game designer."" Because the first amendment
protects artistic expression, 4 this forgotten issue should lie at the
core of a first amendment analysis of video game regulation.
Most courts that have addressed this first amendment issue
follow the reasoning in America's Best Family Showplace, Corp. v.
167. See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 153, at 1188-89 n.9; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG, supra note 132, at 726-27; Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
168. G. GUNTHER, supra note 153, at 1188-89 n.9. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Re-
gents, 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
169. G. GUNTHER, supra note 153, at 1188-89 n.9.
170. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967).
171. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974).
172. See supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
173. See infra notes 216-32 and accompanying text.
174. See infra notes 249-72 and accompanying text.
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City of New York, 175 and hold that the first amendment does not
protect video games.176 The plaintiff in America's Best challenged
New York City's interrelated video game licensing and zoning laws.
The city's statutory scheme authorized it to grant a video game
operator's license to an establishment with no more than four
video game machines if the facility qualified as a designated type
of establishment, such as a restaurant, laundromat, or retail
store.17 7 If a prospective licensee sought to install more than four
video game machines, the city's Administrative Code required the
establishment to qualify as an arcade and obtain a special arcade
license. 17 8 Acquiring an arcade license was difficult because New
York permitted arcades in few city zoning districts and because
the City Planning Commissioner had sole discretionary authority
to approve a license request pursuant to his opinion concerning the
propriety of the proposed arcade's location. 7 9
The cause of action in America's Best arose when the plaintiff
sought to reopen a financially doomed restaurant and make it prof-
itable again by installing an innovative "new twist"-forty dining
tables imbedded with coin-operated video games. 180 The plaintiff,
however, realized that the restaurant was not in a district that per-
mitted operation of more than four games per establishment.' 8'
Rather than risk the civil and criminal penalties that violation of
the city's licensing and zoning laws would impose, the plaintiff
sought declaratory and injunctive relief in federal district court.'82
The plaintiff claimed that the city's regulatory scheme violated its
first amendment freedom of speech and fourteenth amendment
substantive due process and equal protection rights. 8'
175. 536 F. Supp. 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
176. See Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc. v. Town of Marshfield, 389 Mass. 436,
N.E. 2d - (1983). Malden Amusement Co., Inc., v. City of Malden, No. 82-1840-S (D.
Mass. Jan. 25, 1983); 1001 Plays, Inc. v. Mayor of Boston, 387 Mass. 879, 444 N.E.2d 931
(1983); Caswell v. Licensing Conm'n for Brockton, 387 Mass. 864, 444 N.E.2d 922 (1983);
City of New York v. Rambling Ram Realty Corp., No. 81-43556 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 10,
1982) (memorandum opinion); Playtime Games, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 82-9629 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. June 1, 1982). But see Oltmann v. City of Palos Hills, No. 82-3568, slip op. at 13-14
(Ill. Cir. Ct. Aug. 20, 1982); Gameways, Inc. v. McGuire, No. 81-17300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 3,
1982).
177. America's Best Family Showplace, Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. at 172
n.4.
178. Id. at 172.
179. Id.






The plaintiff described video games as "visual and aural
presentations on a screen involving a fantasy experience in which
the player participates. 11 4 In addition, the plaintiff analogized
video games to motion pictures and referred to Stern Electronics,
Inc. v. Kaufman,' a copyright case in which District Judge Nick-
erson described a video game as a "movie in which the viewer par-
ticipates in the action as [a] fearless pilot controlling the space-
ship."186 The plaintiff also argued in its memorandum of law that a
video game is a "designer's original work of authorship which com-
municates through the aid of a machine, 187 but the court did not
discuss this argument in its opinion. The plaintiff relied principally
on the Supreme Court's decision in Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim," to formulate the legal foundation for its argument.
8 9
In Schad, the appellant installed a coin-operated mechanism in its
adult bookstore that allowed customers to view a live nude dancer
performing behind a glass panel.190 The Court held that this en-
tertainment deserved first amendment protection, 9' and invali-
dated Mount Ephraim's ordinance banning all live entertainment
within the town as a substantial and inadequately justified restric-
tion on protected activity.
92
In America's Best, District Judge McLaughlin rejected the
plaintiff's arguments and held that video game software was not a
form of expression which the first amendment protects. 93 Judge
McLaughlin admitted that although the Supreme Court stated in
Schad that the first amendment protects "entertainment, as well
as political and ideological speech,"'9 4 he felt that, given the deci-
sions in other entertainment cases, the first amendment protects
entertainment only when it communicates some idea or element of
information.'" He found that video games completely lacked any
184. 536 F. Supp. at 173.
185. 523 F. Supp. 635 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), afl'd, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
186. 523 F. Supp. at 639, quoted in Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 13, America's
Best Family Showplace, Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 170 (1982).
187. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law, at 14, America's Best.
188. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
189. America's Best Family Showplace, Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. at
173.
190. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. at 62.
191. Id. at 65.
192. Id. at 65-66.
193. America's Best Family Showplace, Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. at
173.
194. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. at 65.
195. America's Best Family Showplace, Corp., 536 F. Supp. at 173.
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requisite communicative or informational element. 196 Judge Mc-
Laughlin reasoned that all video games, even those that talk or
play music, are "pure entertainment" like games of pinball, chess,
or baseball and have no informational or communicative ele-
ment.197 Despite the Supreme Court's observation that the line be-
tween informing and entertaining is very elusive, Judge McLaugh-
lin readily distinguished video games because he felt that they
completely lacked any communicative elements.198
In City of New York v. Rambling Ram Realty Corp.,199 the
New York City trial court analyzed the same law and facts similar
to those in America's Best and supplied additional justifications
for denying first amendment protection to video games. The court
agreed with the conclusion in America's Best that expression will
receive first amendment protection only if it communicates infor-
mation or an idea.200 In addition, the court stated that communica-
tion worthy of first amendment protection could assume either of
two forms. First, a creator could communicate to a viewer in a
Professor Zeigler recently espoused support for the holding in America's Best by opin-
ing that courts probably would not grant video games first amendment protection. Zeigler,
Trouble in Outer Galactica: The Police Power, Zoning, and Coin-Operated Video Games,
34 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 453, 499-501 (1983). Professor Zeigler admitted that the Court's en-
tertainment decisions granting first amendment protection to movies and dancing indicate
that video games arguably could be a form of entertainment within the scope of the first
amendment. Id. at 498. Nevertheless, he attempted to distinguish video games from dancing
and movies as follows:
Since movies and dancing are considered to be generic vehicles for the expression
of opinions and ideas, they are entitled to first amendment protection despite the fact
that they are often designed solely for the purpose of entertainment. Because the line
between informing and entertaining expression is considered to be too elusive in the
context of these generic vehicles for communication, the Supreme Court appears to
have established a general prophylactic rule for protecting these forms of expression.
Coin-operated video games may be a form of expression with the potential for affecting
public attitudes and behavior. They are not, however, likely to be considered generic
vehicles for communication. Consequently, courts are unlikely to grant to such expres-
sion the presumption of first amendment protection.
Id. at 499. In concluding that courts probably will not grant video games first amendment
protection because video games do not communicate information, Professor Zeigler, like the
America's Best court, failed to appreciate that the Court, in its live nude dancing decisions,
effectively eliminated its communicative element requirement in first amendment entertain-
ment cases. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); Doran v. Salem
Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972); see infra notes 272-
94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's live nude dancing decisions and
their impact upon the communicative element requirement, see infra notes 272-94.
196. America's Best Family Showplace, Corp., 536 F. Supp. at 173.
197. Id. at 174.
198. Id.
199. No. 81-43556 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 10, 1982) (memorandum opinion).
200. Id. at 13.
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packaged form, such as a film, painting, dance, or sculpture, that
exists without any participation by the viewer or receiver. The
viewer observes the work without creating or changing it. 2°1 Sec-
ond, several individuals may communicate by directly exchanging
ideas. This form of communication could be either verbal, as in a
debate or discussion, or nonverbal as in a dance when the dancer
invites the audience to participate.
02
The Rambling Ram court held that video games do not qualify
as either form of communication,0 " but are dormant devices that
reflect only the ideas of the player who activates the machine.
The court analogized video games to coin-operated juke boxes,
which similarly do not receive first amendment protection.20 ' The
court stated that video games, like juke boxes, are purely a form of
recreation in which players create their own entertainment by us-
ing mechanical and electronic devices.0 5
Contrary to the holdings in America's Best and Rambling
Ram, however, some courts have extended first amendment protec-
tion to video games. In Gameways, Inc. v. McGuires,20 6 another
case arising under New York City's video game ordinances, the
trial court held that video games are a form of speech which the
first amendment protects. The court rejected Judge McLaughlin's
conclusion in America's Best that video games lacked the commu-
nicative or informational element necessary to receive first amend-
ment protection. 0 7 The Gameways court reasoned that other
forms of protected entertainment, such as viewing live nude danc-
ing through a coin-operated mechanism in an adult bookstore,0 8
are no more communicative or informative than video games, and
that the line between informing and entertaining is extremely elu-
sive. Accordingly, the court concluded that video games also




204. Id. at 14. See Fitchburg v. 707 Main Corp., 369 Mass. 748, 343 N.E.2d 149 (1976);
Commonwealth v. Blackgammon's Inc., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 445, 417 N.E.2d 377 (1981)
(holding that a statute which governed licensing of establishments offering entertainment on
Sundays did not violate the first amendment rights of the defendant who operated a juke
box, played other recorded music, and offered dancing on Sundays).
205. Id.
206. No. 81-17300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 3, 1982) (memorandum opinion).
207. Id. at 5-6.
208. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).




recently applauded the Gameways holding and similarly granted
first amendment protection to video games in Oltmann v. City of
Palos Hills.2 10 The Oltmann court reasoned that video games are
similar to motion pictures, which have enjoyed first amendment
protection since the early 1950's,211 and concluded that video
games also deserve first amendment protection.21
IV. VIDEO GAMES: ARTISTIC EXPRESSIONS AND POPULAR
ENTERTAINMENT THAT DESERVE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
A. The Video Game: An Artistic Expression
The courts that have heard first amendment challenges of mu-
nicipal ordinances which regulate video game entertainment have
focused primarily on the game-playing experience to determine
whether free speech protects video games. Coincidentally, the
courts virtually have ignored the fact that video games, like motion
pictures, theatre, dance, and other forms of entertainment which
enjoy first amendment protection, are the product of individual ar-
tistic expression.2 1 One may understand fully the artistic character
of a video game only by analyzing the designer's creative process,
the game's characteristics, and the experience it provides. By over-
looking the video game designer's creative process, courts have
failed to appreciate the dependency of the artistic work on its crea-
tor. As William Butler Yeats philosophically suggested in his poem
Among. School Children, one cannot "know the dancer from the
dance' '214 because the life of each depends on the existence of the
other.2
15
1. The Video Game Artist and the Creative Process
Video game companies introduce hundreds of video games
each year. Most are commercial failures. 218 This statistic has com-
pelled video game manufacturers to admit that the creativity of
the game designer is the keystone of success in the video game
210. No. 82-3568 (ll Cir. Ct. Aug. 20, 1982).
211. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
212. Oltmann v. City of Palos Hills, No. 82-3568, slip op. at 13-14 (111. Cir. Aug. 20,
1982).
213. See supra cases cited at note 176.
214. W. B. YEATs, Among School Children, in NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF POETRY 928, 930
(rev. ed. 1975).
215. Conversation with Paul L. Bennett, Professor of English at Denison University,
Granville, Ohio (fall 1979).
216. Games That Play People, supra note 2, at 54.
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market.21 7 Of the approximately 200 people currently working as
video game designers only about a dozen have gained recognition
as creative superstars..21  Alan Miller, a video game designer for Ac-
tivision, Inc., is a member of this elite group.219 He and three other
video game designers founded and structured Activision to appease
the artistic needs of video game designers who felt that the games
they designed were self-expressive creations and not mere
commodities.220
Activision and other video game companies now prominently
include the promotion of their designers in advertising cam-
paigns.2 21 James H. Levy, president and chief executive of Activi-
sion, noted that the best designers develop unique styles and that
their names practically have become trademarks which help the
companies sell games.222 Activision promotes its designers on tele-
vision and includes their photographs and tips on how to play the
games in game instruction books. As a result, loyal video game
players have flooded Activision daily with thousands of letters ad-
dressed to individual designers.22
Each video game designer engages in a unique creative pro-
cess. Alan Miller, for example, begins with an idea and draws
rough sketches of the characters and playing field that he envi-
sions.224 He then writes a description of the game's theme and how
the characters will interact. After refining his idea, Miller retires to
his nearby home and "spends days alternately staring out the win-
dow at trees and painstakingly translating his idea into an initial
ten to twenty pages of detailed computer code. ' 225 Miller then
"burn[s]" his final written video game program, typically contain-
ing 2000 to 3000 separate instructions, into a computer chip that
ultimately governs the game's action and images.2 6 Finally, Miller
spends several months working on the game's "playability" to en-
sure that it is "challenging without being impossible. '227 To trans-
217. Wall St. J., supra note 3, at 1.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 22. Activision now designs video games for Atari and Intellivision, Inc.,
maintains "five separate 'design centers' on the East and West Coasts," and controls "about
15% of the [home] game-cartridge markets." Id.
221. Id. at 1.
222. Id.
223. Id.






form the game into a polished final product, he fields comments
and criticism from other designers about the game's theme, graph-
ics, and color, and plays the game for hundreds of hours to remedy
any stubborn problems in the game's software.22
2. The Video Game: The Artistic Work
Video games are colorful, graphic, audio-visual displays of
images that resemble cartoon movies and perform in accordance
with a preconceived theme. Video games originate as creative ideas
of designers and achieve their colorful thematic form through the
medium of computer science. The designer embodies original ideas
in a computer chip, and a cathode ray tube projects the computer
chip's contents as a series of images on the video game screen. The
fact that the video game display emanates from computer software
does not lessen the artistic value or originality of the designer's
work.2 29
In the seven years since Atari first introduced its primitive
black and white video ping pong game, designers have experi-
mented with a variety of innovative design techniques and have
created increasingly more sophisticated, challenging, and colorful
video games. For example, the designer of ZAXXON, a video game
that Gremlin Industries, Inc. manufactures, created spectacular
video graphics by using shadows and motion to create a three-di-
mensional effect. Activision designer Alan Miller also experi-
mented for approximately two months with red and green lensed
glasses in an attempt to design a three-dimensional video game.
23 0
Mattel, Inc., recently developed and introduced a talking video
game that places the player in the cockpit of a B-17 bomber flying
a mission over Europe, and which uses antique radio voices to
warn the player of impending perils.2 1 One designer also foresees
future generations of video games that will use videotaped or
filmed backgrounds instead of cartoon-like video graphic images to
obtain more realistic video game effects."2
The brilliance of the video game as an artistic work is the op-
portunity the game provides each player to participate actively in
the entertainment experience. This characteristic distinguishes
video games from other forms of artistic entertainment that typi-
228. Id.
229. Stern Elec. Inc. v. Kaufman, 523 F. Supp. at 639.
230. Wall St. J., supra note 3, at 14.




cally require their audiences to observe passively and is undoubt-
edly responsible for the widespread popularity which video games
have achieved.
3. The Video Game: Integrating Its Artistic Elements
Simultaneous examination of the creative processes of the
video game designer, the video game's audio-visual characteristics,
and its playing experience indicates that the video game is an in-
novative artistic expression. Like a motion picture, a dance, a
painting, or a novel, the video game essentially is the original idea
or expression of an individual. The expression of an idea through a
particular medium, whether it is oil paint on canvas, a musical in-
strument, or computer software, does not make a work less original
because the individual's final work in each of these forms is the
manifestation of the individual's artistic idea. Although individuals
usually enjoy artistic entertainment through passive viewing or lis-
tening, the fact that video games allow players to participate ac-
tively in the entertainment experience does not make them less
communicative or expressive of the game designer's original
idea.238 Rather, the ability of players to participate actively in the
video game's preconceived entertainment experience is the game's
artistic brilliance. The player does not alter, change, or create the
video game experience by participating in it. Instead, the game's
artistic qualities are preset and the game designer predetermines
the player's entertainment parameters through the ideas and
themes that the designer embodies in the video game software.
B. First Amendment Protection of Artistic Expression
Courts and commentators currently agree that the constitu-
tion's framers originally designed the first amendment to protect
against governmental censoring of printers and to abolish common
law sedition, which made public criticism of government a crime.2"
The first amendment, however, in addition to protecting and pro-
moting open political discourse, now protects a variety of "speech"
including artistic expression. Professor Emerson attributes the ex-
pansion in scope of first amendment protection of expression to
startling technological changes in society, including the growth and
power of mass media, computerized data collection systems, and
233. But see City of New York v. Rambling Realty Corp., No. 81-43556 at 13-14.
234. See Z. CHAFEE, FRE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 3-35 (1941); G. GuNTHMI,
supra note 156, at 1107-08.
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other devices and systems that threaten personal privacy.235 He
also cites the expansion of American governmental functions and
the power of large public and private organizations as contributors
to this development.3 6 These and other societal changes naturally
have introduced many novel first amendment issues to courts and
have caused the American constitutional system of free expression
to "expand to the limits of [its] logic. '237 Thus, courts expressly or
implicitly have broadened the scope of first amendment expression
to include symbolic nonverbal protests, 28 political motivated eco-
nomic boycotts, 23 9 commercial advertising,240 motion pictures,241
pornography,2 42 theatrical and musical performances, 243 dance,244
and other expressions possessing some serious artistic, literary, po-
litical, or scientific value.245
The legal foundation of first amendment protection of artistic
expression arises from Supreme Court precedent in the areas of
entertainment, offensive speech, and obscenity, and from the fun-
damental values that the Court's first amendment doctrine serves.
Early in the twentieth century when first amendment cases prima-
rily concerned criminalization of various forms of political speech,
the principal objective underlying the Court's protection of free
speech was to discover truth by encouraging competition between
truth and falsity in the marketplace of ideas.246 The Court consist-
ently has considered discovery of truth a value that underlies its
first amendment decisions. 247 As the scope of first amendment ex-
235. Emerson, supra note 141, at 422.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. E.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that two
junior high students had a first amendment right to wear black armbands to school in pro-
test of the Vietnam War).
239. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 50 U.S. L.W. 5122 (U.S. July 2, 1982) (hold-
ing that black citizens have a first amendment right to participate in an economic boycott of
white merchants to achieve legitimate civil rights objectives if the individual defendants do
not engage in violent or otherwise criminal activity). But see Longshoremen v. Allied Int'l,
Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982) (in which the Court rejected the first amendment claim of the
longshoremen's union that refused to unload cargoes shipped from the Soviet Union in pro-
test of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan).
240. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
241. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
242. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
243. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
244. See, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
245. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 18, 24 (1973).
246. Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. Rv.
964, 967-74 (1978).
247. Baker, supra note 246, at 968. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
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pression expanded over the years, however, so did the values that
the first amendment serves. Professor Emerson asserts that free-
dom of expression now has become essential to "(1) individual self-
fulfillment; (2) the advancement of knowledge and the discovery of
truth; (3) participation in decision-making by all members of soci-
ety; and (4) maintenance of the proper balance between stability
and change. ' 24 8 Courts, by granting first amendment protection to
artistic expression, seem to promote most significantly the value of
individual self-fulfillment.
1. Artistic Expression and the Self-Fulillment Value
Professor Emerson suggests that the growing emphasis on the
first amendment's function to protect individual self-fulfillment re-
flects an emerging concern of courts with modern society's ten-
dency "to inhibit the growth of the individual personality and the
individual's autonomy and self respect.' '2  The late Justice Wil-
liam 0. Douglas championed the Court's new emphasis on individ-
ual self-fulfillment as a value underlying the first amendment.250
Justice Douglas developed this self-fulfillment notion in his due
process privacy opinions in the 1950s that emphasized an individ-
ual's need for a right of free personal choice. 25 1 He argued that the
right to personal choice allows the individual to realize his poten-
tial as a human being by pursuing his own goals and developing his
talents and abilities.252 Moreover, Justice Douglas felt that al-
lowing individuals to choose freely would promote stronger indi-
vidual "character and integrity"'53 and would benefit society by
encouraging attempts to strive toward "new horizons.'
2 "
In Griswold v. Connecticut5 5 Justice Douglas recognized as
340 (1974) (in which Justice Powell stated that we can only correct pernicious opinions by
encouraging "the competition of other ideas").
248. Emerson, supra note 149, at 423. Professors C. Edwin Baker and Laurence H.
Tribe concur in the belief that the value of individual self-fulfillment underlies the first
amendment. See L. TmE, supra note 133, at 576; Baker, supra note 246, at 990-96. Profes-
sor Bork, however, argues that courts explicitly should accord first amendment protection to
political speech, and not to literary, obscene, or scientific expression. Bork, Neutral Princi-
ples and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
249. Emerson, supra note 149, at 425.
250. Id. at 424.
251. Note, Toward a Constitutional Theory of Individuality: The Privacy Opinions of
Justice Douglas, 87 YALE L.J. 1579, 1589 (1978).
252. Id. at 1589 & n.57.
253. Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451,469 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
254. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
255. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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the basis of a fundamental right to use contraceptives the right to
privacy within one's personal associations that the "penumbra" of
the first amendment envelops.25 Thus, Justice Douglas implicitly
invoked the self-fulfillment value as a reason for using the first
amendment to protect an individual's right to free choice in sexual
and familial matters.5 Justice Douglas further expounded his po-
sition on the foundational values of the first amendment in his dis-
sent in Gillette v. United States,2 58 a case concerning an individual
who objected for religious reasons to being drafted during the Viet-
nam war. Justice Douglas stated that he "had always assumed that
the welfare of the single human soul was the ultimate test of the
vitality of the First Amendment." 259 Concurring with the majority
in Roe v. Wade,260 Justice Douglas crystalized his views by stating
that one purpose of the first amendment was to help individuals
secure "autonomous control over the development and expression
of [their] intellect, interests, tastes, and personality.
'261
The right to express one's thoughts, ideas, and emotions artis-
tically is central to the first amendment value of individual self-
fulfillment because artistic expression essentially is man's act of
expressing his thoughts, visions, and ideas, and developing his tal-
ents and abilities. Moreover, some psychologists argue that crea-
tive expression also is an outlet which enables man to manage
emotional instability and avoid neuroses that the pressures of eve-
262ryday life can cause. Thus, creative expression serves as a balm
that therapeutically promotes an individual's emotional and psy-
chological well-being and self-fulfillment..2 6 3 Thus, because video
games are the artistic manifestation of an individual's original
256. Id. at 482-84.
257. Emerson, supra note 149, at 424; Note, supra note 251, at 1588-89.
258. 401 U.S. 437, 469 (1971).
259. Id. at 469, quoted in Emerson, supra note 149, at 424.
260. 410 U.S. 113, 211 (1973).
261. Id. at 211, quoted in Emerson, supra note 149, at 424-25.
262. Conversation with Mr. Paul Bennett, Professor of English, Denison University
(Fall, 1979).
263. The benefits that creative expression affords individual artists, the artistic works
which man's creative process conceives have provided mankind with a tremendous source of
beauty and entertainment. Although the video game may be a mundane form of artistic
expression, the Court has repeatedly remarked that "[w]holly neutral futilities . . . come
under the protection of free speech as fully as do Keats' poems or Donne's sermons." Young
v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 87 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 528 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). See Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (in which the Court reversed a peace demonstrator's con-
viction for disturbing the peace that he received for entering a courthouse wearing the in-
scription "Fuck the Draft" sewn onto his jacket).
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ideas and creative process, first amendment protection of them
would further the first amendment value of individual self-fulfill-
ment that the late Justice William 0. Douglas and others have
envisioned.26'
2. Artistic Expression and the Court's Entertainment, Offensive
Speech, and Obscenity Opinions
In its entertainment, offensive speech, and obscenity opinions,
the Supreme Court has suggested that the first amendment pro-
tects artistic expression. For example, in Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc.,65 Justice Stevens observed that the first amend-
ment will not tolerate the total suppression of sexually explicit
pornographic motion pictures if they possess "some arguably artis-
tic value."266 Because of the films' sexually explicit character, how-
ever, Justice Stevens demoted pornographic motion pictures to a
level of first amendment protection weaker than the protection ap-
plicable to political debate or nonpornographic films. The Justice
also implied that nonpornographic and nonobscene materials pos-
sessing arguably artistic value deserve full first amendment
protection.67
264. See supra notes 250-54 and accompanying text.
265. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
266. Id. at 70.
267. Id. at 70-71. Professor Zeigler argues that if courts characterize video game ex-
pression as first amendment speech, they probably will classify it within the lesser protected
category of commercial speech. Zeigler, supra note 132, at 502. He reasons that a coin-oper-
ated video game arguably embodies the expression of a game designer's idea, and that courts
might consider this embodied expression an inducement to engage in the commercial trans-
action of playing the game. Id. at n.288. This argument, however, ignores the similarity
between the creation, production, and marketing of books, motion pictures, and video
games. All three forms of expression originate as the creative idea of an individual artist,
whether it be the novelist Ernest Hemingway, the filmwriter Steven Spielberg, or the video
game designer Alan Miller. See supra notes 216-28 and accompanying text. Commercial
enterprises such as publishers, motion picture production companies, and video game manu-
facturers then transform the artist's idea into commercially salable products-published
novels, motion pictures, and coin-operated video games. These companies then sell the
finished products to distributors and retailers who sell or lease these products to interested
consumers such as bookstores, motion picture theaters, and video game arcades and purvey-
ors. The process of creating and marketing books, motion pictures, and video games, there-
fore, is very similar. Additionally, books and motion pictures that are neither obscene nor
pornographic receive full first amendment protection even though commercial profit is the
purpose of their production and marketing. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. at
501. Thus, Professor Zeigler's statement that the video game designer's idea, which a com-
mercially marketed video game embodies, falls within the lesser protected commercial
speech category is erroneous given the fact that commercially marketed novels and motion
pictures enjoy full first amendment protection.
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Similarly, the Court addressed in its obscenity opinions its
concern with the artistic value of challenged expressions. The
Court, while consistently holding that obscene material is com-
pletely without first amendment protection, has struggled to for-
mulate a standard which distinguishes obscene and nonobscene
materials or expressions. This distinction is crucial because the
materials that legislatures characterize as obscene usually consist
of movies, literature, magazines, and live performances, but if
courts do not judge these materials obscene, they generally will
receive first amendment protection from harsh government regula-
tion. In Miller v. California,268 Chief Justice Burger finally enunci-
ated the Court's obscenity standard, which allows states to enforce
criminal penalties against works that-taken as a whole-appeal to
the prurient interest in sex, that portray sexual conduct in a pa-
tently offensive way, and that-taken as a whole-do not have se-
rious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.26 This standard
implies that materials which possess artistic value enjoy first
amendment protection. Thus, the first amendment should embrace
video game software, which essentially is an individual's artistic
creation expressed through the technology of computer science.270
C. The Entertainment/Communication Dichotomy and the
Communicative Element Requirement in First Amendment
Entertainment Cases
1. The Entertainment/Communication Dichotomy
The principal argument against granting video games first
amendment protection is that they are solely entertainment be-
cause they communicate no idea or information. The courts that
have accepted this argument, however, have failed to analyze care-
fully the historical development of the communicative element re-
quirement in entertainment cases. This dichotomy between en-
tertainment and communication in first amendment cases
developed from the early Puritan beliefs that entertainment was
inherently evil2 71 and that people should engage in more serious
matters.272 Commentators also cite as a reason for this dichotomy
268. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
269. Id. at 24.
270. See supra notes 213-32 and accompanying text.
271. Note, Motion Pictures and the First Amendment, 60 YALE L.J. 696, 704 n.20
(1951) (citing 2 DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AmERICA 75-76 (Reeve ed. 1889)).
272. Note, supra note 271, at 704 n.20 (citing Reisman & Denny, Do the Mass Media
"Escape" from Politics? in READER IN PUBLIC OPINION AND CoMMuNIcATIoN 327 (Berelson &
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the antiquated belief that fictional expression does not communi-
cate any ideas significant to the formation of public opinion.27
Consequently, courts in the early 1900s accepted state and local
government censorship of entertainment as a proper exercise of the
police power.2  In Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission,275
for example, the Court upheld the constitutionality of an Ohio mo-
tion picture censorship statute. In its opinion, the Court character-
ized motion pictures as pure entertainment that operates solely for
profit and not as an organ of public opinion. 6
2. The Demise of the Entertainment/Communication
Dichotomy
The Supreme Court began to grapple with the entertainment/
communication dichotomy in the late 1940s when, in Winters v.
New York,2 77 it recognized a vendor's first amendment right to sell
magazines consisting primarily of criminal news, police reports,
and accounts of criminal deeds of bloodshed and lust. The Court
rejected the city's argument that the first amendment free press
right protects only the communication of ideas and not entertain-
ment.7 8 Justice Reed reasoned that, although the Court could see
nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines, they
held the magazines deserved as much free speech protection as the
best of literature because the distinction between informing and
entertaining was too elusive to function as a threshold requirement
for granting entertainment first amendment protection. 9
3. Emergence of the Communicative Element Requirement
Four years after Winters v. New York, the Court decided Jo-
seph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,2 80 which specifically overruled Mu-
tual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission by extending first
amendment protection to motion pictures. The Court ultimately
rejected the strict dichotomy which Mutual Film created between
entertainment and communication by restating that the line be-
Janowitz eds. 1950)).
273. Note, aupra note 271, at 705 n.22.
274. Id. at 703.
275. 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
276. Id. at 244.
277. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
278. Id. at 510.
279. Id.
280. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
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tween entertaining and informing is "too elusive" to serve as the
threshold test of first amendment protection. 81 The Court, how-
ever, emphasized "that motion pictures are a significant medium
for the communication of ideas [and could] affect public attitudes
and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a
political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which
characterizes all artistic expression."8 ' The Court also stressed
that even though companies design movies to entertain and in-
form, and produce them as part of a large-scale, profit-oriented
business, movies still deserve first amendment protection."'
Although the Supreme Court rejected the strict entertain-
ment/communication dichotomy in Joseph Burstyn, it arguably es-
tablished the requirement that entertainment still must communi-
cate some type of idea or information to receive first amendment
protection. The Court included expressions of social, political, and
artistic significance in its definition of communicative element,
284
and felt that the motion pictures in Joseph Burstyn possessed ar-
tistic expression in addition to the more traditional forms of first
amendment speech. '85 The Court, however, did not clarify whether
a form of entertainment that contains only artistic expression and
little, if any, political or social communication, would also receive
first amendment protection. The Court intimated an answer to this
question twenty years later in its nude dancing cases. 86
4. The Communicative Element Requirement After the Court's
Nude Dancing Decisions
The Court's decisions in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.," 87 and
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 88 signaled a significant dim-
inution of the communicative element requirement in first amend-
ment entertainment cases. In Doran, the Court stated that the first
amendment might protect a bar owner's right to provide topless
dancing entertainment to his customers. 89 Justice Rehnquist and
281. Id. at 501 (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)).
282. Id. (citing INGLIS, FRmmOM OF THE MoviEs 20-24 (1947)) (emphasis added). See
Note, supra note 271, at 704-08.
283. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. at 501-02.
284. Id. at 501.
285. Id. at 501-02.
286. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); Doran v. Salem
Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
287. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
288. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
289. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. at 932.
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seven other justices made this statement even though they recog-
nized that this customary type of barroom nude dancing contains
only the barest minimum of protected expression. 90 Six years later
in Schad, the Court held that the first amendment protected an
adult bookstore owner's right to install and operate coin-operated
devices which allowed customers to watch a live nude dancer per-
form behind a glass panel. 91 Justice White, writing for the major-
ity, reasoned that entertainment, as well as ideological and politi-
cal speech, enjoys first amendment protection.292
The Doran and Schad opinions diverge significantly from
other first amendment entertainment cases because the Court
failed to discuss the communicative element requirement before
granting first amendment protection to nude dancing. Moreover,
live nude dancing in bars and adult bookstores communicates lit-
tle, if any, ideological, political, or social information. In light of
American Mini Theatres,293 however, Doran and Schad seem ex-
plicable because both nude dancing and pornographic movies ar-
guably convey some element of artistic expression, which the first
amendment now protects. Thus, Doran and Schad suggest that ei-
ther virtually all entertainment or, at the least, entertainment
which possesses an infinitesimal amount of artistic expression and
little or no ideological, political, or social information, deserves
first amendment protection. Under either interpretation, however,
Doran and Schad implicitly have extended first amendment pro-
tection to a wide variety of entertainment that arguably conveys
no political, social, or ideological communication including, such as
abstract art, music without words, and video games. Thus, the
courts that denied first amendment protection to video games be-
cause the games lack a communicative element failed to recognize
the complete impact of Doran and Schad upon this component in
first amendment analysis.
5. Video Games: Artistic Entertainment That Deserves First
Amendment Protection
Video games, like motion pictures and dance, contain and ex-
press the original creative ideas of individual artists.2 9 Although
video games may convey simple-minded themes and only minimal
290. Id. at 932.
291. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. at 66.
292. Id. at 65 (citations omitted).
293. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 213-33 and accompanying text.
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amounts of political, social, or idealogical information, they are no
less communicative than the live nude dancers in Doran and
Schad.29 5 Because of the debilitating impact that Doran and Schad
had on the communicative element requirement in first amend-
ment entertainment cases, video games possess the requisite artis-
tic and expressive elements to justify receipt of first amendment
protection. In addition, granting video games first amendment pro-
tection as free speech would be consistent with the Court's growing
recognition that artistic expressions deserve such protection,"' and




Although the first amendment historically promoted discovery
of truth primarily in the realm of political and social discourse,
courts have expanded its scope significantly and currently use it to
protect artistic expression and entertainment. Because artistic ex-
pression and entertainment are often inseparably interwoven, the
recognition of each as a type of protected free speech experienced
parallel and often intersecting treatment in first amendment adju-
dication. Free speech protection of artistic expression arises prima-
rily from judicial acceptance of the principle that the first amend-
ment should promote individual self-fulfillment.2 8 The Supreme
Court, in cases concerning various forms of entertainment, offen-
sive speech, and potentially obscene expression, has manifested
support for the protection of artistic expression by searching for an
act's artistic value to serve as a basis for granting first amendment
protection. 99
Judicial recognition of free speech status for artistic expres-
sions and the underlying first amendment value of individual self-
fulfillment spurred similar recognition of first amendment protec-
tion for entertainment. Entertainment had long suffered from the
puritanical belief that it was evil and lacked social value. Conse-
quently, courts in the early twentieth century strictly distinguished
entertainment from expression that communicated social and po-
295. See supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text for a discussion of Gameways,
Inc., which held that the live nude dancing in Schad was no more communicative than video
games.
296. See supra notes 268-72 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 251-67 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 249-64 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 266-70 and accompanying text.
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litical ideas, and granted first amendment protection only to com-
municative expressions.300 The Supreme Court subsequently re-
jected this strict dichotomy and, in the landmark case of Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,301 granted first amendment protection to
motion pictures. In Joseph Burstyn, however, the Court diverged
cautiously from the puritanic tradition of suspicion for entertain-
ment by emphasizing that although motion pictures entertain
audiences, they also shape public opinion by communicating social,
political, and artistic ideas. Thus, the Court arguably established a
communicative element requirement in first amendment entertain-
ment cases. The Court, however, failed to specify the quantum and
nature of the communication necessary to command first amend-
ment protection.
The Court's live nude dancing decisions in Doran v. Salem
Inn, Inc.30 2 and Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,"'3 however,
significantly weakened the communicative element requirement
from Joseph Burstyn. Unlike motion pictures, which typically con-
vey social, political, ideological, and artistic expressions, live nude
dancing in a tavern or an adult bookstore arguably conveys only an
infinitesimal amount of artistic expression. Perhaps more signifi-
cant is Justice White's explicit statement for the majority in Schad
that entertainment, as well as political and ideological speech,
deserves first amendment protection. Thus, Doran and Schad sug-
gest that entertainment possessing some small element of artistic
expression deserves first amendment protection. Because most
forms of entertainment tend to contain at least some artistic ex-
pression, however, Doran and Schad also may suggest more
broadly that virtually all entertainment deserves first amendment
protection.
Consideration of the Supreme Court's entertainment cases as
a whole indicates that Doran and Schad erect a protective wall
against unreasonable state and local regulation of a wide variety of
entertainment, including video games. The impact of applying free
speech status to video games is difficult to predict. Granting video
games first amendment protection, however, certainly will not pro-
scribe reasonable regulation of video games. Rather, the strict judi-
cial scrutiny that the first amendment authorizes will question se-
riously only the propriety of controversial forms of video game
300. See supra notes 271-76 and accompanying text.
301. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
302. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
303. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
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regulation, such as total prohibition of commercial video game es-
tablishments, harsh restrictions on the number of video games per-
missible per establishment, burdensome establishment locational
standards, and harsh restrictions on the age of video game players.
Courts employing first amendment scrutiny would analyze
carefully harsh video game regulation because the land-use plan-
ning objectives that video game ordinances seek, such as the pre-
vention of truancy, vandalism, crime, litter, and noise, are achieva-
ble through less restrictive regulatory means. For example, local
governments could require video game purveyors to meet strict
adult supervision requirements,0 and to prohibit minors from
playing video games only during school hours 05 in efforts to curb
truancy and juvenile delinquency. Governments also could impose
strict but reasonable spacial requirements0 6 for each game and
prohibit the sale or presence of food or alcoholic beverages30 7 in
video game arcades to prevent crime, loitering, and overcrowding.
Local governments also could require video game purveyors to
comply with stringent noise, litter, and other aesthetic standards30 8
and reasonable operating hour restrictions0 ' to protect the peace
and appearance of surrounding neighborhoods. These regulations
probably would curb the problems commonly associated with video
game playing in a reasonable manner and would pass first amend-
ment scrutiny because they address these problems directly with-
out sweeping too broadly or unduly burdening video game purvey-
ors. In general, the first amendment will force local governments to
draft video game legislation with precision and demonstrate that
these ordinances substantially further the objectives that the gov-
ernments designed them to achieve in a manner that is least re-
strictive of video game entertainment.3 10 Thus, granting first
amendment protection to video games would be a significant step
toward reasonable municipal licensing and zoning regulation of
video games.
JOHN E. SULLIVAN
304. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
307. See Zeigler, supra note 132, at 463. See also M. Jaffe, supra note 15, at 13.
308. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 144-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme
Court's first amendment analysis.
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